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JAMES L. KAINEN*
Truth, Deterrence, and the
Impeachment Exception
n James v. Illinois, the Supreme Court attempted to draw a
bright-line rule halting the impeachment exception's steady
erosion of the exclusionary rule's prohibition against using
illegally obtained evidence against criminal defendants at trial.'
A sharply divided Court held that the prosecution may use such
2
evidence to impeach a defendant, but not a defense witness.
According to the Court, prohibiting impeachment of defense
witnesses with illegally obtained evidence, while allowing
impeachment of defendants, was necessary to sustain an
appropriate balance between truth seeking at trial and
deterrence of prosecutorial illegality.3 Also to maintain the
balance, the Court reaffirmed two previously established limits
that applied to impeachment of defendants: first, the
prosecution may use illegally obtained evidence only to impeach
the defendant's credibility and not as substantive evidence of
guilt.4  Second, illegally obtained evidence must impeach
testimony volunteered on direct examination or elicited on
* A.B. Brown University; J.D. Harvard Law School. Professor and Director of
Trial Advocacy Competitions, Fordham University School of Law. Thanks to the
Fordham Faculty Colloquium (especially Russ Pearce and Sonia Katyal) for
comments and to Michele Higgins for research assistance.
I James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 309 (1990).
2 Id. at 320.
3 See id.
4 See id. at 313 n.3 (citing cases requiring that the trial judge instruct the jury to
use illegally obtained evidence only to assess defendant's credibility and not as
evidence of guilt); id. at 313 ("This Court insisted throughout this line of cases that
'evidence that has been illegally obtained ... is inadmissible on the government's
direct case, or otherwise, as substantive evidence of guilt."' (quoting United States v.
Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 628 (1980) (omission in original)) (emphasis added)).
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cross-examination in response to questions "'plainly within the
scope of the defendant's direct examination.' 5 For this purpose,
any questions "suggested to a reasonably competent cross-
examiner, 6 by direct testimony are permissible, subjecting to
impeachment statements made in response to cross-examination
"reasonably suggested, 7 by the direct.
Since James, the lower courts have struggled to apply the
distinction between impeachment of defendants and defense
witnesses when confronted with prosecutors' recurrent attempts
to impeach with evidence of nontestifying defendants' hearsay
declarations. For evidentiary purposes, introduction of a
hearsay declaration automatically makes the declarant a
functional witness subject to impeachment.8 The James Court
did not address that possibility, however, when it found that
deterrence policy required distinguishing impeachment of
defendants from defense witnesses to prohibit impeachment of
the latter with illegally obtained evidence. The holding of the
opinion, therefore, did not decide whether (or when) the
exclusionary rule allows the impeachment of defendants'
hearsay declarations. Since extending the exception to
defendants' hearsay declarations shifts, and possibly obliterates,
the line between permitted and prohibited impeachment,
resolution of this issue is critical to James's quest for additional
deterrence.
This Article argues that the results in the lower courts, despite
Herculean efforts to police the boundary of the exception
consistently with James, are inconsistent, unpredictable, and
undetermined. Unpredictability prevents the exclusionary rule
from having any meaningful deterrent effect besides that which
already flows from preventing use of illegally obtained evidence
in the prosecution's case-in-chief. The probability that a
nontestifying defendant will suffer impeachment if he offers any
evidence of his exculpatory words or conduct typically
discourages him from introducing the evidence or allows its
rebuttal. Either result effectively allows the prosecution to
benefit from its illegally obtained evidence. Meanwhile, defense
5 Id. (quoting Havens, 446 U.S. at 627).
6 Havens, 446 U.S. at 626.
7 Id. at 627.
8 See FED. R. EVID. 806.
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counsel has sometimes offered exculpatory evidence despite the
risk of rebuttal or without being cognizant of its potential
consequence. Since James's unpredictable application
sometimes prevents using illegally obtained evidence to rebut
evidence of defendants' exculpatory behavior, courts
sporadically prohibit the impeachment. 9 That result inhibits
fact-finding accuracy but does not establish any pattern that will
deter future illegal conduct. Ironically, the net result of
uncertainty surrounding James's application to defendants'
hearsay declarations is the opposite of what James intended.
The doctrine impedes truth seeking while having no
compensating deterrent effect to further encourage compliance
with constitutional requirements.
In this Article, Part I analyzes the irresolute debate over
extending the impeachment exception to nontestifying
defendants as a consequence of the Court's misguided
conception of an ideal balance between truth seeking and
deterrence. It shows that the Court has failed to conceive this
balance coherently as a trade-off involving exclusion's inevitable
compromise of truth seeking. Instead, it has embarked on a
misconceived quest for an exception that purports to promote
the truth without undermining deterrence. Consequently, it has
justified the scope of the impeachment exception with an
ambiguous analysis of truth seeking rather than a coherent
conception of deterrence. This ambiguous analysis, which
vacillates between witnesses telling and juries finding the truth,
generates the uncertainty that undermines both goals. Indeed,
compared to the situation engendered by current doctrine,
flipping a coin to determine admissibility of illegal impeachment
proof would substantially improve truth seeking and deterrence.
Part II shows how the Court has exploited the ambiguous
conception of truth seeking to develop an idea of impeachment
for purposes of constitutional exclusionary rule policy that is
narrower than evidentiary impeachment. It inconsistently
justifies the narrowed conception by its truth seeking rather than
deterrent effects. Consequently, courts are required to distort
evidence law to limit the impeachment of criminal defendants
with illegally obtained evidence.
9 See infra note 29.
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Part III shows how courts looking to realize James's promised
deterrence by restricting or prohibiting impeachment of
nontestifying defendants under FRE 806 are caught in the same
trap. The Court's analysis requires them to portray exclusion of
the evidence as consistent with evidentiary principles, although
they would not require exclusion if the evidence were lawfully
obtained. The effect of the approach is to render the scope of
the exception dependent upon manipulable distortions of
evidence law without any assurance that doing so serves
constitutional deterrence policy.
Part IV demonstrates how courts allowing more generous
impeachment ironically suffer a similar fate. They begin by
allowing prosecutors to impeach nontestifying defendants when
defense evidence of their conduct qualifies as hearsay. But the
hearsay requirement in this context does not establish a
meaningful limit on impeachment. Therefore, those courts must
also distort evidence law to avoid allowing full evidentiary
impeachment or simply acknowledge that they are eviscerating
James. Whether the defendant is a hearsay declarant whom one
may impeach because his credibility is relevant is a test designed
to decide admission of impeachment evidence that is not
otherwise substantively permissible rebuttal. It cannot bear the
weight of excluding proof that rebuts exculpatory inferences
from the defendant's words or conduct supposedly because the
rebuttal implicates no aspect of his credibility. Applying the
hearsay/credibility test therefore becomes another occasion for
courts to make a choice between truth telling and truth finding
that is ungoverned by evidence law and unrelated to deterrence.
Part V argues that the unpredictable application of James's
ambiguous truth-seeking rationale to nontestifying defendants'
impeachment robs the exclusionary rule of any deterrent effect
beyond that which flows from its application during the
prosecution's case-in-chief. Disallowance of illegal
impeachment may occasionally occur, but its unpredictability
prevents that cost to the truth from generating additional
incentive to forego illegality. Besides uncertainty, the
impeachment exception's link to truth seeking at trial, rather
than to investigatory choices, prevents accrual of net benefits in
1020 [Vol. 86,1017
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the truth-seeking/deterrence balance.'0  Instead of allowing
particularly probative impeachment, Part V urges flipping a coin
which, even if not likely to be adopted, vividly illustrates the
need to abandon relative truth-seeking benefits at trial as the
determinant of the impeachment exception's coverage.
I
HOW TRUTH SEEKING USURPS DETERRENCE IN THE BALANCE
PURPORTING TO JUSTIFY THE IMPEACHMENT EXCEPTION
The debate over applying the impeachment exception to
nontestifying defendants illustrates a flaw in what now amounts
to over a half-century's worth of the Court attempting to
establish an optimal level of deterrence by weighing it against
the truth-seeking costs of allowing illegally obtained evidence for
impeachment purposes. Rather than help establish optimal
deterrence, efforts to "fine-tune" the balance between
deterrence and fact-finding accuracy demonstrate that there is
no correspondence between criminal investigation and the
potential uses of illegally obtained evidence that justifies tying
optimal deterrence to evidentiary notions of impeachment. One
can begin by assuming that the Court accurately conceives that a
complete ban on illegally obtained evidence at trial imposes a
fact-finding cost that deterrence does not justify. Yet the way to
avoid it is not by allowing the evidence where the Court
imagines the impeachment is particularly probative. Earmarking
a class of illegally obtained evidence as admissible because it is
particularly probative inevitably creates additional incentives for
obtaining it. If the prosecution can use illegally obtained
10 For example, suppose there were an easily applied, certain boundary to the
exception (say, no illegally obtained evidence unless the defendant testifies at trial,
in which case it all comes in) justified by the special truth-seeking benefits of the
evidence in the circumstance where it is allowed. For the exception to generate net
benefits, the prosecution would have to ignore the prospect of making especially
probative use of illegally obtained evidence. It is simply implausible to imagine this
scenario and with it the likelihood that any exception to the exclusionary rule
justified by the truth-seeking benefits of a category of evidence allowed at trial will
ever fail to generate equivalent deterrence disadvantages. There is always the
possibility that, after making use of particularly probative evidence at trial, all who
know of that use will drink the Lethean draft and forget the benefit realized. But if
that possibility were true, we would not need the exclusionary rule at all. As long as
we believe that exclusion is the consequence, we are deterred, and if, after imbibing
of the Lethean draft we forget that the evidence is admitted, we can always have
maximum truth seeking and deterrence.
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impeachment evidence when it really makes a difference, even
its selective admission may effectively remove any deterrence
beyond that which already flows from preventing the
prosecution from using it in its case-in-chief.
The consequence for the scope of the exclusionary rule at trial
is ironic. Achieving additional truth seeking that is not excessive
in its deterrence cost is the goal. However, its accomplishment
requires counterintuitive means. It requires selective allowance
of illegally obtained impeachment evidence according to a
pattern that does not mirror the evidence's contribution to truth
seeking, or else any truth-seeking benefits induce offsetting
deterrence costs. Ideally, the pattern would allow the evidence
only when the prospect of its use beyond the prosecution's case-
in-chief would not affect criminal investigators' decisions to
obtain it illegally." Allowing the proof only when the profit to
the prosecution would not encourage subsequent illegal
behavior would obviously yield net benefits. Those benefits,
however, would accrue because the prospect of attaining them
would create no additional incentive to obtain evidence illegally,
not because the evidence was particularly probative. More
accurate fact finding would merely be a beneficial consequence
of not excluding evidence when unnecessary to deter, a
dependent variable with no independent influence upon the
scope of the exception. In contrast, allowing truth-seeking
influence by admitting some illegally obtained impeachment
only because it is particularly probative assures that the benefits
of obtaining it illegally cannot help but to increase the incentive
to obtain it.
11 Identifying occasions when suppressing evidence has no effect on investigators'
behavior appears to be the goal of lower courts requiring a "cognitive nexus"
between the misconduct and the crime for which the defendant is tried before
suppressing evidence, even in the prosecution's case-in-chief. See, e.g., State v.
Booker, 135 P.3d 57, 59 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that deterrence of police
misconduct does not require suppression of defendant's drug paraphernalia
obtained during an unsuccessful search for a kidnapping victim when offered during
defendant's trial for a subsequent assault upon the person who summoned police to
his apartment). Nonetheless, the Court has yet to accept the proposition that one
can safely identify circumstances under which admission of illegally obtained
evidence will have such a benign consequence, and whether it might do so is beyond
the scope of this Article. Currently, the Court holds that because additional
deterrence from prohibiting the use of illegally obtained evidence beyond the
prosecution's case-in-chief is necessary, though speculative, the benefits of
deterrence must be weighed against their truth-seeking costs. See Oregon v. Hass,
420 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1975).
[Vol. 86, 1017
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Undoubtedly because of the inability to identify circumstances
where impeachment use has no effect on investigators' behavior,
the Court has not allowed deterrence alone to drive the scope of
the exception. Instead, it has treated truth seeking as an
independent variable, useful in helping to determine the
exception's boundaries as the product of a "balance" on a scale
comparing the marginal benefits of exclusion (fewer
constitutional violations) to its marginal costs (fewer accurate
verdicts). Yet balance, at least in the sense of symmetry as in a
balance sheet, is too apt a metaphor. Absent identification of
occasions when admissibility beyond the case-in-chief will not
affect investigative choices at all, any truth-seeking benefit
presumptively exacts a commensurate deterrence cost as the
prosecution realizes the benefit of the evidence it obtained.
Nothing about impeachment distinguishes it from other evidence
in this regard; the evidence's probity determines its contribution
to establishing the truth and the incentive to obtain it.
To avoid the offsetting loss of deterrence and enjoy net gains
from reducing what the Court posits are gratuitous truth-seeking
costs, uncoupling the evidence's admissibility beyond the case-
in-chief from its truth-seeking benefits (and so the incentive to
obtain it) is necessary. The inability to identify particular
investigative choices that are insensitive to the potential
impeachment use of illegally obtained evidence is not necessarily
a bar. All that is necessary is eliminating truth seeking as an
independent variable. One can do that by making the ability to
use illegally obtained evidence as impeachment depend upon the
flip of a coin. Compared to unfettered impeachment use or
complete exclusion, truth seeking and deterrence will be
improved .t  What the coin flip does not do is induce offsetting
costs to one value by benefiting the other. The prosecution's
prospective payoff remains constant at only fifty percent,
whatever the proof's truth-seeking benefits. So there will always
be some incentive, beyond preventing use on the case-in-chief,
marginally deterring a decision to obtain the proof, while some
illegally obtained evidence will always qualify for admission,
enhancing truth seeking.
12 Insofar as there is truth-seeking cost unnecessary to give the prosecution
sufficient incentive to comply with constitutional requirements, we will reduce it by
up to half. Insofar as there is insufficient deterrence from suppression only in the
case-in-chief, we will increase it by up to half.
20071 1023
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In contrast to the coin flip, the status quo employs a decision
rule that always allows the prosecution to benefit from illegally
obtained evidence. In all cases, it is potentially admissible
impeachment, and will therefore benefit the prosecution one
hundred percent of the time. Even if not admitted to impeach
exculpatory testimony, the evidence still benefits the prosecution
by discouraging such testimony. So additional deterrence
depends entirely on the prospect that the inability to use it to
impeach or discourage defense witnesses' testimony will
marginally deter the prosecution from obtaining evidence
nonetheless useful to impeach/discourage the defendant's
testimony. For any deterrence at all to flow from such an
already slim circumstance, two things are critical. First, the
distinction between impeaching the defendant and other defense
witnesses must be clear enough to enable prudent defense
counsel to call such witnesses without fear of paving the way for
admission of illegally obtained evidence. Second, the category
of excluded defense witness impeachment must be wide enough
to render the possibility of marginal deterrence plausible.
However, the Court undermines those principles by linking the
distinction between impeaching defendants and defense
witnesses, like the other boundaries of the exception, to truth-
seeking goals. Although required to effectuate the deterrence
held necessary by James, the lower courts are equipped with
doctrine requiring them to run a fool's errand to find a truth-
seeking rationale for preventing impeachment of defendants'
hearsay declarations.
That truth seeking preempts deterrence in the lower courts
analyses of nontestifying defendants' impeachment is an
unsurprising consequence of the Supreme Court's approach.
Deterrence considerations alone hardly suffice to explain, much
less justify, the doctrines (1) allowing impeachment only of
testimony elicited on direct examination or on cross examination
"reasonably suggested by the . . . direct,"' 13 (2) requiring use of
impeachment evidence "only to impeach,, 14 and (3) limiting
impeachment to defendants but not defense witnesses.' 5 Indeed,
the Court has barely tried to explain or justify its approach. It
13 United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627 (1980).
14 Id. at 628.
15 James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 313 (1990).
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has said nothing about circumstances under which police are
likely to be dissuaded from obtaining evidence illegally because
it will fail the "reasonably suggested by the direct test," be
admitted to impeach the defendant but not his witness, or, once
admitted, be subject to limiting instructicn restricting its use to
impeachment. Instead, the Court has simply noted that without
these limitations, the occasions upon which courts will admit
illegally obtained evidence would be more frequent-a veritable
tautology that ignores how illegally obtained evidence is equally
useful when, although not admitted, it discourages the
exculpatory testimony that it would otherwise impeach.
16
In place of reasons rooted in criminal investigation, the Court
has explained the exception's evidentiary limits as a product of
truth-seeking considerations.1 7 These purport to show that the
impeachment exception applies only when the truth-seeking
costs of applying the exclusionary rule beyond the case-in-chief
are high enough to justify lost deterrence. In James, for
example, the Court reasoned that defense witnesses have a lesser
motive to testify falsely than defendants do, and so the prospect
of impeachment with illegally obtained evidence is not as
16 The best the Court could do was to assert that "inadmissibility of illegally
obtained evidence must remain the rule, not the exception." Id. at 319. Courts
allow truth seeking to usurp even this modest goal by allowing impeachment of
nontestifying defendants whenever defense evidence implicates their credibility.
Comparing the Court's treatment of the incentive to obtain impeachment
evidence illegally when lawful means have failed with the incentive when lawful
means may still bear fruit also illustrates how truth-seeking concerns preempt
deterrence considerations. The police have substantial incentive to give Miranda
warnings despite being allowed to use unwarned statements to impeach because, if
warned, the statements may also be used on the prosecution's case-in-chief. The
police do not have a similar incentive to cease questioning when a suspect invokes
his right to silence because there is no likelihood of using statements subsequently
acquired except to impeach. The police have everything to gain and nothing to lose
by acting illegally in the latter, but not the former, situation. See Steven D. Clymer,
Are Police Free to Disregard Miranda?, 112 YALE L.J. 447, 506-07 (2002).
Although the deterrent effects of allowing impeachment use of statements obtained
under each circumstance may differ dramatically, the Court has elected to consider
them the same. It sees the incentive to obtain unwarned and postinvocation
statements for impeachment as equally "speculative," effectively rendering their
admission dependent upon their contribution to truth seeking. Compare Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (allowing impeachment with unwarned statements),
with Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (allowing impeachment with statements obtained after the
defendant requested a lawyer, when police had nothing to lose by unlawfully
continuing the interrogation).
17 See James, 493 U.S. at 314.
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important to encourage them to speak truthfully. 8 Similarly, the
Court reasoned that defendants, having less control over their
witnesses' testimony than their own, would be dissuaded from
calling witnesses who, although possessed of probative evidence,
might open the door to illegally obtained evidence in
unanticipated direct testimony or cross-examination reasonably
related to the direct.19
The suggestion that fact-finding accuracy justifies the limited
scope of the exception, however, is the cause of the
unpredictability of the exception's application generally and of
James's application to nontestifying defendants' hearsay
declarations in particular. The only way that the Court sustains
the illogical argument that some restrictions on admission of
otherwise admissible probative evidence exact a lesser truth-
seeking cost is by employing an ambiguous explanation of how
evidence contributes to accurate fact finding at trial. On one
hand, the Court regards this contribution in terms of finding the
truth, helping the fact finder reach the presumptively accurate
conclusion that conforms to all the evidence admissible under
usual evidentiary processes. On the other, the Court perceives
the contribution in terms of speaking the truth, preventing
defendants from relying on testimony that, considering the
illegally obtained evidence, appears false. In the latter sense, the
impeachment exception is less concerned with the accuracy of
the fact finder's verdict than with assuring that specific
falsehoods do not inform its conclusion. Often, the Court
presents this view as specifically concerned with preventing
"perjury" from going unexposed. It therefore further narrows
the exception's purpose to preventing defendants from offering
intentionally false testimony, not that which is merely mistaken.
But since honestly mistaken testimony also detracts from fact-
finding accuracy, perhaps even more significantly than
intentional lies, and the Court ultimately justifies preventing
perjury as a means to assure fact-finding accuracy, its position on
whether it cares only about deliberate lies is no more settled
than its straddle of the prior choice between juries finding and
witnesses speaking the truth.
18 See id. at 314-15.
19 Id. at 315-16.
1026 [Vol. 86, 1017
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What should be an argument about how to achieve the
additional deterrence James promised, therefore, has become a
study in how the doctrine leads the lower courts to manipulate
the concept of truth seeking to justify broader or narrower
applications of the exception. The broader exception allows
rebutting any defense evidence that, without the prosecution's
illegally obtained evidence, potentially points the fact finder
toward a false verdict. The narrower exception aims to allow
rebutting only specific falsehoods. Both find support.
The contours of the exception-confining use of illegally
obtained evidence to credibility and limiting impeachment to
testimony on direct examination or on cross-examination plainly
within the scope of the direct-appear as narrow attempts to
assure only that witnesses speak the truth, not to prevent the
exclusionary rule from interfering with the accuracy of the fact
finder's conclusion once the defendant has elicited evidence.
Emphasis on the latter would not justify excluding illegally
obtained evidence that, although not exactly contradicting
specific testimony about matters the defendant chose to raise,
nonetheless rebutted the potentially false inferences that
defendant sought to establish with the evidence. Similarly, the
James Court argued that fact-finding accuracy would suffer more
from preventing impeachment of defendants than defense
witnesses because the former, having an interest in the outcome,
would be more likely to give false testimony.20 But it did not
consider how defendants' interest in the outcome would
discredit their testimony without further impeachment, or how
defense witnesses' putative disinterest would make their
testimony credible without any impeachment.. Consequently,
while giving lip service to the idea that the purpose of allowing
impeachment was to prevent inaccurate fact finding, one aspect
of the doctrine focused narrowly on inaccuracies flowing from
the likelihood of false testimony.
Another aspect of the Court's analysis, however, focuses
specifically on fact-finding accuracy. First, the Court justified
the prevention of false testimony by explaining the negative
impact that falsehoods have on the accuracy of the trier of fact's
20 See id. at 313-17.
21 See id.
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22
ultimate determination. Then, the Court withdrew false
inferences' immunity from contradiction conferred by the
"plainly within the scope of ... direct" limitation by defining it
to allow any questions "suggested to a reasonably competent
cross-examiner." 23 That standard allows counsel to explore all
exculpatory inferences suggested by the direct testimony,
effectively empowering the prosecution to rebut any inferences
from the proof that impede fact-finding accuracy. Finally, the
James Court argued that the prohibition on impeachment of
defense witnesses is consistent with fact-finding accuracy. 24 It
reasoned that, uncertain of whether defense witnesses will
confine their testimony to avoid opening the door to admission
of illegally obtained proof, defendants would forego calling them
although the witnesses could offer probative exculpatory
25
evidence.
The contrast between speaking and finding the truth informs
the current conflict over applying the impeachment exception to
the exculpatory words and conduct of a nontestifying defendant.
Some courts have prevented extending the exception to
nontestifying defendants by giving renewed life to the idea that
26the exception aims to impeach only specific false testimony.
That requirement did less to prevent using illegally obtained
evidence to impeach testifying defendants after the Court
allowed impeachment of testimony elicited on cross-examination
27
about matters "reasonably suggested" by the direct testimony.
22 See id. at 311 (stating that the impeachment exception is concerned with
helping fact finders "'arriv[e] at the truth' (quoting United States v. Havens, 446
U.S. 620, 626 (1980))).
23 Havens, 446 U.S. at 626-27.
24 See James, 493 U.S. at 315 (expanding impeachment exception may deter
defendants from introducing reliable evidence).
25 See id. at 316 n.6 (noting that impeaching a defense witness or taking
impeachment of a defendant too far prevents the defense from providing probative
exculpatory evidence).
26 See, e.g., United States v. Trzaska (Trzaska I), 111 F.3d 1019,1024-25 (2d Cir.
1997) (holding illegally obtained statements inadmissible because they were
insufficiently inconsistent with defendant's hearsay declarations); People v. Trujillo,
49 P.3d 316, 322-25 (Colo. 2002) (holding that impeachment by illegally obtained
evidence is permissible only if it presents a direct contradiction with the witness's
trial testimony).
27 See, e.g., United States v. Morla-Trinidad, 100 F.3d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1996)
(finding use of illegally obtained evidence of participation in the crime permissible
after defendant's direct testimony that impliedly denied involvement in events
constituting the charged crime was "reasonably construed" to contradict
[Vol. 86, 10171028
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The rule suppressed the conflict between using illegally obtained
evidence only to show that the defendant's specific testimony
was false and to rebut any potentially false inferences the jury
may draw from it. Simply by cross-examining the defendant
about the inferential facts he would have the jury draw from his
direct testimony, the prosecutor elicits responses that allow her
to contradict as false testimony inferences that might otherwise
be immune from contradiction.
In contrast, when a nontestifying defendant's hearsay
declaration is impeached, he is not available for cross-
examination about inferential facts that may be drawn from it.
There is no cross-examination "reasonably suggested by the
direct" in which the prosecutor can make the defendant
incorporate inferences from his hearsay declaration into his
testimony as a prelude to contradicting them. Questions about
the hearsay declaration's literal truthfulness rarely address all of
the exculpatory inferences it supports. Consequently, courts
considering impeachment of a nontestifying defendant's hearsay
declaration cannot avoid deciding between pursuing truth telling
and truth finding, and some have used the opportunity to
exclude evidence that, although admissible under FRE 806, they
29find insufficiently related to the former.
government witnesses' testimony on noncollateral matters); U.S. ex rel. Russell v.
Haws, No. 99 C 4223, 2002 WL 31056724, at *12-14 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 2002)
(holding that where defendant testifies on direct examination to calling X from
home during approximate time of the crime, prosecution can introduce and then
contradict defendant's illegally obtained statement that he called Y during that
same period); Manns v. State, 122 S.W.3d 171, 192-93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)
(concluding that evidence of defendant's conduct during illegal interrogation is
admissible to rebut testimony designed to convey "impression of forthrightness"
during interview and trial testimony). But see People v. Lawson, 762 N.E.2d 633,
640-41 (I11. App. Ct. 2001) (holding that it is improper to admit illegally obtained
statements that the prosecution concedes did not relate to any specific statements
made by the defendant on direct examination because purpose of impeachment
exception is to prevent perjurious testimony).
28 Courts have yet to allow prosecutors to call defendants to cross-examine them
about their hearsay statements despite the argument that, by offering those
statements, defendants waive their privilege against self-incrimination as if they had
testified to those same matters on direct examination.
29 See, e.g., Trzaska II, 111 F.3d at 1024-25. Other cases have prohibited use of
illegally obtained evidence when the defendant did not testify without considering
whether other defense evidence established the defendant as a hearsay declarant.
See, e.g., State v. Brockman, 725 N.W.2d 653, 655-56 (Iowa Ct. App. 2006); State v.
Green, 500 S.E.2d 452, 466 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (Horton, J., dissenting); State v.
Brooks, No. 92-1982-CR-FT, 1992 WL 380886, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 1992)
2007]
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More courts have allowed FRE 806'0 its full scope,
emphasizing that truth finding requires no less.31 Still others
have gone further to allow impeachment of defendants'
statements to experts who base opinions on them, even if those
statements were not admitted as hearsay.32 For these courts, the
challenge is hardly to find an evidentiary rationale for admission
of evidence that enhances fact-finding accuracy; that much is a
forgone conclusion. Instead, it is to show how promoting truth
seeking by extending the exception to admit illegally obtained
evidence whenever it impeaches the credibility of nontestifying
defendants' exculpatory conduct leaves anything for James to
(unpublished disposition). These cases show that prosecutors have been slow to
make the argument. Nonetheless, its near universal success when made, see cases
cited infra note 31, suggests that they will press the claim with increasing frequency.
30 FED. R. EvID. 806 (allowing a party to attack the credibility of a hearsay
declarant).
31 See, e.g., Appling v. State, 904 S.W.2d 912, 916-17 (Tex. App. 1995) (allowing
impeachment of nontestifying defendant's hearsay statements if illegally obtained
evidence has some bearing on their credibility); Hendrickson v. Norris, 224 F.3d
748, 751 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Trzaska (Trzaska 1), 885 F. Supp. 46, 48-50
(E.D.N.Y. 1995), rev'd, 111 F.3d 1019 (2d Cir. 1997); Wilkes v. United States, 631
A.2d 880, 887-88 (D.C. 1993); People v. Barcheers, No. D036109, 2001 Cal. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 279, at *32-35 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2001); People v. Johnson, 50
Cal. Rptr. 2d 17, 18-19 (Ct. App. 1996); People v. Williams, 692 N.E.2d 1109, 1125-
26 (Ill. 1998); People v. McCartney, 563 N.E.2d 1061, 1066-67 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990);
State v. Weeks, No. W1998-00022-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 Tenn. Crim App. LEXIS 775,
at *56-57 (Oct. 2, 2000) (Ogle, J., dissenting) (holding that defendant's illegally
obtained statements can be used to impeach contradictory statements made to his
psychiatrist, but not as "substantive evidence" to rebut the defendant's insanity
defense); State v. DeGraw, 470 S.E.2d 215, 221-24 (W. Va. 1996).
32 See, e.g., Barcheers, 2001 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 279, at *32-35 (holding that
defendant's illegally obtained statements are admissible to cross-examine a defense
psychiatrist, where they contradict statements that the defendant made to the
psychiatrist and upon which he relied in forming his expert opinion, because
admitting the statements serves the same truth-seeking function as impeaching the
defendant); Wilkes, 631 A.2d at 887-91 (stating that James allows impeachment of a
defense psychiatrist whose opinion relies on defendant's statements because the
rule prohibiting impeachment of defense witnesses does not apply to experts who
are allowed to base their testimony on knowledge imparted by others; impeachment
of the defense psychiatrist properly includes eliciting contrary opinions from
prosecution psychiatrists relying on the illegally obtained statements); Williams, 692
N.E.2d at 1128 (holding that prosecution can use illegally obtained statements on
cross-examination of expert because such statements are not admitted to "impeach
the expert, but rather to test the soundness and fairness of the expert's opinion");
DeGraw, 470 S.E.2d at 221-24 (finding no error admitting a defendant's illegally
obtained statements inconsistent with statements on which his expert relied because
the real witness impeached by the illegal statement, since it was not admitted for its
truth, was the defendant).
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exclude. In this, only one thing is certain: using the evidentiary
concept of impeachment as a limiting principle to prevent or to
justify extending the exception to nontestifying defendants
requires distorting evidence law and therefore fails to decide a
question that only deterrence policy can answer coherently.
II
DISTORTING EVIDENCE LAW TO LIMIT THE IMPEACHMENT OF
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
In its most coherent incarnation, the impeachment exception
prohibits the prosecution from using illegally obtained evidence
as part of its affirmative case for a defendant's guilt while
allowing it to use illegally obtained evidence to rebut defense
evidence.33 Under the exception, a fact finder would use illegally
obtained evidence only when evaluating defense evidence, but
not as affirmative evidence of guilt. To abide by that
requirement, a fact finder ideally would have to employ a two-
stage fact-finding process. First, it would decide whether the
prosecution's legally obtained evidence alone proves beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime. If
not, it should return a verdict of not guilty, and there is no need
to proceed. If, however, the fact finder concludes that the
prosecution's lawful proof establishes guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, it should proceed to the second stage. At the second
stage, the fact finder decides whether all the evidence, including
the defense evidence and the prosecution's illegally obtained
rebuttal, still supports a guilty verdict.
Neither the Court, nor any lower court, has ever considered
translating into an actual two-stage determination this ideal way
of distinguishing between using illegally obtained evidence
affirmatively to prove guilt and only to attack the credibility of
defense evidence. This failure should not be surprising since it
would be unprecedented to ask a fact finder essentially to render
consecutive verdicts on the same elements of the same charges in
33 See James L. Kainen, The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rules:
Policies, Principles, and Politics, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1301, 1352-53 (1992); see also
Wilkes, 631 A.2d at 884 (affirming jury instruction to consider illegally obtained
evidence rebutting defendant's affirmative defense only after first finding, without
reference to the illegally obtained evidence, "that the Government has proven
every element of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt").
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the same case.34 Nor is it apparent that courts should invent such
a procedure. The impact that a two-verdict system would have
on juries and the expectations they bring to the fact-finding
process in criminal cases is highly uncertain, however ideal the
procedure may be in theory.35
Moreover, it is hardly clear that even an actual two-stage jury
verdict would solve all the impeachment exception's problems.
The defense may, as it virtually always does, elicit evidence on
cross-examination of the prosecution's witnesses.36 Considering
the extent to which evidence elicited by the defendant from
prosecution witnesses invites admission of illegally obtained
evidence would remain a central problem.37  Indeed, that
problem is particularly salient when one includes the possibility
of impeaching a defendant's hearsay declaration, as likely to be
elicited on cross-examination of a prosecution witness as on the
34 Courts have used the "two-step" instruction only in the unusual circumstance
where one can separately apply the evidence to an affirmative defense whose
elements do not overlap those of the crime. See Wilkes, 631 A.2d at 884. Nor has
anyone suggested actually using separate juries, one to render a verdict on the
prosecution's direct case, made exclusively with lawfully obtained proof, and the
other to render a verdict on the entirety of the proof, including the defense case and
the prosecution's unlawfully obtained evidence. To do so would exact an enormous
efficiency cost and pose the same difficulties of deciding whether the defense has
crossed the line into presenting a case through examination of witnesses called by
the government.
35 For example, juries may feel manipulated by a system that first prevents them,
and then allows them, to consider illegally obtained evidence. This could induce
them to assume that there is always more than what we allow them to hear, making
them more inclined to convict to avoid being "fooled."
36 In such a case, the trial does not neatly divide, by formal announcement that
the prosecution has rested, into the prosecution's lawful affirmative case considered
alone (without reference to defense evidence), and the prosecution's entire case
(including illegally obtained impeachment proof) considered in conjunction with
the defense evidence.
37 Potential solutions range from the extremes of not holding the defendant
responsible for any evidence elicited from a witness that the prosecution calls, to
holding him responsible for anything the witness says on cross-examination. An
intermediate solution might hold that the defendant is responsible only for evidence
outside the scope of direct examination. But the solution would then implicate the
myriad, and notoriously difficult to apply, definitions of the scope of direct. See,
e.g., 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 21, at 83-84 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed.
1992) (noting that the "subject matter" of direct may be read narrowly to mean the
points or facts testified to, more broadly to mean the transactions described in the
testimony, or most broadly to mean the issues affected by the testimony). In the
end, there is no reason to think that any of these evidentiary concepts would
necessarily solve a question that has to do with deterrence, not the purposes of the
scope-of-direct rule.
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defense case. Although ideal in theory, a two-stage process
would fail because it provides no way to define the evidence
available at each stage. The idea of the prosecution's affirmative
case does not necessarily include only evidence elicited by the
prosecution during its case-in-chief or also include defense
evidence adduced before the prosecution rests.
Since there is no institutional way to ensure that a jury will
decide whether the prosecution's lawful proof alone establishes
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt before proceeding to consider
illegally obtained evidence, courts have employed available
evidentiary mechanisms to confine the use of illegally obtained
proof to its discrediting effect upon defense evidence. They
have done so in several ways. Often, courts simply rely on a
limiting instruction telling the jury to consider the evidence only
to impeach the credibility of defense evidence and not as
affirmative proof of guilt. Without further explication of what it
might mean to use the evidence only in that fashion, the
instruction may be intended to get the jury to mimic the ideal
two-step deliberation. In effect, this burden-of-proof-styled
instruction asks the jury temporarily to forget that it is
considering whether to find an historical fact from all the
evidence. Instead, it should ignore defense evidence and the
prosecution's (unlawfully obtained) rebuttal first to make a
judgment about whether the prosecution's case-in-chief alone
satisfies its burden. However, since the factual inferences from
the evidence are the same irrespective of whether it is used to
discredit defense evidence or as affirmative proof of guilt, the
likelihood that the jury will accomplish this feat before resuming
its usual role of historical fact finder is exceedingly slim.
38
38 Consider, for example, the following report of a trial court's effort to confine
the use of illegally obtained evidence to contradicting the defendant's proof even
though the contradicting fact also established guilt. The prosecution was for DWI:
At the close of evidence, the court instructed the jury, "The alcohol
concentration established by the analysis of the sample of the defendant's
blood can only be used to impeach evidence presented by the defendant
that he was not under the influence of alcohol." When asked for
clarification from the jury during its deliberations, the trial court provided
the following written response: "The results of the test of defendant's
blood may be used as evidence. However, it may only be used to directly
contradict evidence introduced by the defendant that he was not under the
influence of alcohol. It may not be used for any other purpose."
State v. Brockman, 725 N.W.2d 653,655 (Iowa Ct. App. 2006). One can sympathize
with the jurors who were wrong to conclude that they could use the blood test as
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Consequently, many courts employ evidentiary concepts to
attempt to distinguish between factual inferences supported by
the evidence constituting "affirmative proof of guilt" and
"impeachment" as a prelude to formulating a more typical
limiting instruction allowing the jury to consider only the latter.
Elsewhere in evidence law, instructions distinguishing between
permissible and impermissible factual inferences from proof are
familiar and often presumed effective. Then, considering the
weight of the evidence for the respective inferences and the
likelihood that the jury will ignore those forbidden, the court
may admit the evidence pursuant to the factual-inference-styled
instruction or, if the evidence's impeachment value standing
alone is relatively small, exclude it entirely. Skeptical that juries
will temporally structure deliberations to differentiate using
illegally obtained evidence as affirmative proof of guilt or
rebuttal, those courts employ evidentiary concepts that
distinguish between factual inferences constituting proof of guilt
and credibility evidence.
However laudable this attempt to effectuate the Court's
limited-use mandate may be, the fact remains that, routinely, the
same factual inferences that discredit the defense case
simultaneously advance the prosecution's affirmative case for
guilt. Limiting factual inferences therefore inevitably forbids
fact finders from fully using the illegally obtained evidence even
as it bears on the credibility of defense evidence. This may have
relatively little impact compared to the alternative where courts
simply admit the proof and trust juries to distinguish
"affirmative" from "credibility" use of illegally obtained
evidence without telling them anything more. In both cases, the
jury has heard the proof, and we cannot be certain how either
styled limiting instruction will influence deliberations, if at all.39
Nonetheless, the approach taken makes all the difference when a
affirmative proof of the defendant's drunkenness just because the court allowed
them to use it to contradict his evidence of sobriety. Moreover, it is not even
apparent that courts are absolutely clear that this result is the goal of distinguishing
affirmative proof of guilt from impeachment or that we would want juries to
become accustomed to making decisions that ignore permissible inferences from
proof made known to them.
39 In one case, we cannot be sure that the jury will understand or follow the
admonition not to consider a factual inference that the illegally obtained evidence
supports. In the other, we cannot know how or whether the jury will distinguish
evidence of guilt from credibility, much less expect an ideal two-step deliberation.
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court excludes illegally obtained evidence because its probative
value as "credibility" evidence does not justify the risk that the
jury uses it as "proof of guilt." In that situation, deciding which
factual inferences are permissible, because they implicate
credibility, and which are impermissible, because they implicate
the affirmative case for guilt, is critical.
Moreover, in the post-James cases, it is not enough to
distinguish using illegally obtained evidence as affirmative proof
of guilt from attacking the credibility of the opposing party's
evidence. It is also necessary to isolate the value of illegally
obtained evidence for impeaching the defendant from its value
for impeaching other defense witnesses. Central to this task is
determining whether and how a defendant's credibility may be
an issue, especially if the defendant elicits evidence of his
exculpatory words or conduct but does not testify. A ready
evidentiary analogy is offered by FRE 806, which allows
impeachment of nontestifying hearsay declarants as if they had
testified .40
That rule, however, does not respect the limits that the Court
has placed on defendants' impeachment, even if they did take
the stand. While FRE 806 permits impeachment of a hearsay
declarant, it decidedly does not attempt to limit the use of
allowable impeachment to credibility inferences only. Nor does
it consider overlapping "credibility" and "proof of guilt"
inferences as cause for a limiting instruction or possible
exclusion. Therefore, the alternative responses to proposed
impeachment of defendants' hearsay declarations are the same.
A court can simply give jurors a "defendant's-credibility-only"
instruction on the burden of proof model, accepting that it likely
does not prevent them from using the evidence as proof of guilt.
Or the court can impose limits on using factual inferences that
the impeaching proof supports, either to create a more effective
limiting instruction or, ultimately, to exclude evidence which,
although satisfying FRE 806, similarly presents undue risk of
"improper" use as affirmative evidence of guilt.
Nothing in evidence law prevents dual use of evidence that
bears permissible inferences as impeachment and affirmative
40 FED. R. EvID. 806 ("When a hearsay statement . . . has been admitted in
evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked.., by any evidence which
would be admissible .. . if declarant had testified as a witness.").
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proof of guilt. Indeed, the category of impeachment-by-
contradiction proof acknowledges the especially probative force
of proof whose factual inferences impeach the opposing party's
evidence while also advancing the party's affirmative case, and
virtually all evidence admitted under the impeachment
exception fits the "impeachment-by-contradiction" description.
Consequently, courts using established evidentiary concepts
cannot coherently distinguish between credibility and proof of
guilt inferences to decide whether and how to allow
impeachment of defense evidence. Truth seeking as understood
by evidence law demands admitting impeachment-by-
contradiction proof precisely because its overlapping uses make
it especially probative.
The observation would hardly merit mention if the Court
acknowledged that deterrence provides the only possible
justification for suppressing evidence typically allowed by
evidentiary rules. But the Court has not offered a deterrence
rationale for requiring credibility-only use of illegally obtained
evidence. It has not shown, for example, how credibility-only
use will deter police misconduct, even marginally, compared to
affirmative use. Instead, it suggests that, holding deterrent
effects constant, truth seeking justifies only credibility use
because the probative value of illegally obtained evidence is
highest when used to impeach specific defense testimony. This
requires the lower courts to distort the concept of evidentiary
impeachment to make it appear that truth seeking excludes or
disfavors contradicting substantive evidence amenable to
affirmative use, which it decidedly does not. Unfortunately, such
distortion lies at the root of courts' arguing that truth seeking
justifies confining the use of illegally obtained evidence when
they attempt, in the service of constitutional deterrence policy,
to avoid applying FRE 806 to permit impeachment of a
nontestifying defendant.
III
PREVENTING IMPEACHMENT OF DEFENDANTS' HEARSAY
DECLARATIONS
The leading case refusing to apply FRE 806 to permit
impeachment of a nontestifying defendant's words or conduct is
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the Second Circuit's opinion in United States v. Trzaska.4 1 In
Trzaska, the defendant, a previously convicted felon, was
42
charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.
The police lawfully discovered the contraband with which the
indictment charged Trzaska in a garage he rented.43 Trzaska's
defense was that his son Kevin was in exclusive possession of the
guns and ammunition, even though they were stored in Trzaska's
garage.44 His proof consisted of the testimony of his son,
Kevin. Kevin described how Trzaska told him to pick up the
guns from a friend, who was holding them for Trzaska, but who
46had repeatedly asked Trzaska to take them back . Kevin
further testified as follows:
Q. Do you know why your father asked you to pick them up?
A. He didn't want nothing to do with them anymore.
Q. Did he tell you why [he] didn't want to have anything to do
with them?
A. Because he had too many problems in his past, and he-he
wanted to put it down.
47
On summation, defense counsel used this testimony to establish
that Trzaska was no longer in possession of the guns because he
had surrendered them to his son:
"He (Kevin) told you his father did not want to have
anything to do with them (the guns). He knew it was trouble.
He knew that he was a convicted felon, and therefore was in a
different category than his son. He knew that if he took those
guns into his possession and kept them, that not only was he
risking the violation of parole, but he was also risking sitting
right where he's sitting right now. So he tells his son, 'they're
yours."
48
To rebut the claim that Trzaska surrendered the guns to Kevin,
the government offered a rifle and ammunition that Trzaska's
parole officer illegally seized from Trzaska's apartment several
41 United States v. Trzaska (Trzaska i), 111 F.3d 1019 (2d Cir. 1997).
42 United States v. Trzaska (Trzaska 1), 885 F. Supp. 46, 47 (E.D.N.Y. 1995),
rev'd, 111 F.3d 1019 (2d Cir. 1997).
43 See id.
44 See id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
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days before the lawful search of the garage.49 The government
also offered Trzaska's statement, suppressed as the fruit of the
illegal apartment search: "I'm a drug addict with this; it's a
sickness. ,5
Applying James to allow Trzaska's impeachment (not that of
his son), the trial judge admitted the proffered evidence.5' He
reasoned that when a criminal defendant introduces his own
exculpatory hearsay statement, its probative value depends upon
the defendant's credibility no less than if the defendant had
actually testified.52  Thus, the contraband and the statement
satisfied both FRE 806 and James by impeaching Trzaska's
hearsay declaration. 3
What of James's requirement that the evidence be used only
to impeach the defendant and not to impeach the defense
witness? After all, the government's rebuttal proof might be
used to impeach the in-court witness, Kevin, by suggesting that
Trzaska had never made the statement Kevin attributed to him
or that Kevin had not assumed exclusive control over the guns.
Also, the jury might use the proof as affirmative evidence of
Trzaska's guilt rather than merely to neutralize his evidence. It
might not simply discount the defendant's evidence of
nonpossession of the garage guns, and instead consider Trzaska's
admitted simultaneous possession of the apartment guns as
affirmative proof that he possessed the garage guns rather than,
or together with, anyone else having access to the garage, such as
Kevin. Following the Court's mandate that the prosecution use
illegally obtained evidence only to impeach the defendant, the
trial judge gave a limiting instruction telling the jury "to use
Trzaska's [suppressed] statement ... only to impeach Trzaska's
statement to his son., 54 Here the instruction potentially did
double duty, conveying to the jury that the proof should be used
only to evaluate the credibility of Trzaska (not his son), and then
only to assess Trzaska's evidence, and not as affirmative proof of
his guilt.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 See id. at 49.
53 See id. at 50.
54 United States v. Trzaska (Trzaska 11), 111 F.3d 1019, 1023 (2d Cir. 1997).
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What may have seemed to the trial judge a straightforward
application of James to the unanticipated situation of the
defendant as hearsay declarant became far more complicated,
or, at least, confused, when the Second Circuit reversed the trial
court's decision to admit the illegally obtained evidence in
Trzaska 115 While reversing, the Second Circuit attempted to
avoid two difficult issues presented by the proof: the
constitutional question of whether the prosecution may impeach
a defendant who offers his hearsay declarations rather than his
in-court testimony, and the evidentiary question of whether the
court properly classified Trzaska's statement as hearsay.56
First, since relevant testimony of a defense witness will almost
always include facts about the defendant's words or conduct,
allowing impeachment of defendants' hearsay declarations is not
a simple step; it potentially eviscerates James's purported
limitation on the exception.57 Second, the court thought that
deciding whether Trzaska's statement qualified as hearsay and
thus subjected him to impeachment was particularly
troublesome. It noted that the statement potentially bore
hearsay and nonhearsay inferences, and Trzaska, although
possibly intending to use it only for its nonhearsay inference,
offered it without qualification. Since the prosecution did not
object, the court received the statement without qualification,
leaving its status undetermined until such time as the
government, arguing that the statement was hearsay, attempted
to impeach Trzaska. Under those circumstances, the court
wondered whether it had been proper for the trial court, which
considered the statement hearsay, to treat the statement as
received "for all purposes to which it was relevant" or "only for
the purpose which the proponent intended.
58
55 Id. at 1025.
56 See id. at 1025-26.
57 See infra Part IV.
58 Id. at 1026. The court observed:
The rule could be that the statement was offered for all purposes to which
it was relevant-if this were the rule, Trzaska could be impeached .... On
the other hand, the rule could be that the statement was offered only for
the purpose which the proponent intended it at the time was offered-if
this were the rule, Trzaska could not be impeached ....
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To avoid deciding whether a defendant's hearsay declaration
invites impeachment with illegally obtained evidence or whether
Trzaska's statement should be considered hearsay, the court
held that, even assuming affirmative answers to both questions,
Trzaska's impeachment was improper as a matter of ordinary
evidence law.5 9 Seizing on Trzaska's suppressed statement that
he was like "a drug addict" 6 when it came to firearms and
comparing it with his statement to his son that he "'didn't want
nothing to do with [the guns] anymore,' 61 the appellate court
reasoned that the two statements were insufficiently inconsistent
62to merit the former's admission. It then reversed the
conviction, finding that admission of the suppressed statement
was not harmless error since the jury learned not only that
Trzaska admitted to being addicted to guns, but also that he did
so while commenting on the rifle and ammunition that the police
had seized illegally from his apartment.63
The court based its claim that the statements were
insufficiently inconsistent to merit admission on its
interpretation of Trzaska's statement to his son as establishing
"'intent to relinquish ownership"' 64 or a "desire to give ... to his
son" the guns found in his garage and charged in the
indictment. It then reasoned that one might interpret his
subsequent, suppressed statement that he was addicted to guns
in two possible ways.66 First, the statement might have admitted
a "general" obsession with guns.6 7 Acknowledging that "for two
statements to be inconsistent, they need not be 'diametrically
opposed,"'6 the court nonetheless concluded that whatever
inconsistency there was between the statements was attenuated
59 Id. at 1024-25.
60 Id. at 1025.
61 Id. at 1023 (alteration in original).
62 Id. at 1025.
63 Id.
64 Id. (quoting United States v. Trzaska (Trzaska 1), 885 F. Supp. 46, 47
(E.D.N.Y. 1995), rev'd, 111 F.3d 1019 (2d Cir. 1997)).
65 Id.
66 See id.
67 Id. This general obsession was not necessarily inconsistent with the earlier
desire to give up the guns in the garage because "[a]lcoholics may give away alcohol
and cigarette smokers may give away cigarettes." Id.
68 Id. at 1024 (quoting United States v. Agajanian, 852 F.2d 56, 58 (2d Cir. 1988)).
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because they were uttered approximately a year apart.69
Although it did not discuss why this fact was important, the court
seemed to think that the time elapsed between the stated desire
to give up the guns and the admission of an obsession with guns
increased the likelihood that Trzaska's attitude toward guns had
simply changed. 70 Therefore, the obsession with guns one year
later did not sufficiently contradict the perhaps sincerely held
desire to be rid of them.7' Second, the Court noted that
Trzaska's "addicted" statement might be interpreted as an
admission that he possessed only the specific guns in the
apartment, which were found right before he spoke, not the
garage guns with whose possession he was charged.72  Viewed
this way, the statement was insufficiently inconsistent with the
earlier expressed desire to be rid of different guns, those in the
garage and not the apartment.
73
Whatever merit there may have been in prohibiting Trzaska's
impeachment as a matter of deterrence, the court's attempt to
attribute the result to ordinary evidence law failed miserably. In
concluding that Trzaska's statements were insufficiently
inconsistent to merit his impeachment, the court took three steps
that are unjustified if applied to lawful evidence. First, it ignored
the impeaching effect on Trzaska's statement of his possession of
the apartment guns, quite apart from whether he had said
anything about them at all to his probation officer. Second,
focusing exclusively on Trzaska's statement to his probation
officer, the court treated the statement as if it were merely an
inconsistent statement admissible only for the inconsistency's
bearing on Trzaska's credibility, and not as evidence of any facts
asserted in the statement. Finally, treating Trzaska's confessed
addiction and possession of the apartment guns merely as an
inconsistent statement, the court required a degree of
inconsistency between the statements that would eliminate any
likely explanation except that Trzaska had lied to his son. While
all these moves were explicable as means of shoring up
deterrence by manipulating the constitutional requirement that
69 Id. at 1025.
70 The court noted that the time lapse "clouds" the inconsistency, "[c]onsidering
the changing nature of a person's subjective intent." Id.
71 See id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
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the suppressed evidence be used only to impeach Trzaska's
statement, none were a consequence of the evidentiary concept
of impeachment. Indeed, if one assumes that the Trzaska II
court applied constitutionally permissible impeachment
correctly, analysis of the divergence between it and permissible
evidentiary impeachment in this context illustrates how far the
former's focus on deterrence can, indeed must, deviate from the
latter's focus upon accurate fact finding.
To begin with, there was simply no reason to ignore the
evidence of Trzaska's possession of the suppressed guns and
focus exclusively on his statement. Proof of an inconsistent
statement is surely not the only mode of impeachment; a well-
established form of impeachment is impeachment by
contradiction. 74  Impeachment-by-contradiction evidence
includes any proof that, by contradicting a fact asserted by a
witness, suggests that the witness's testimony is not credible.75
The contradiction may show an honest mistake or a deliberate
lie; in either event, impeachment-by-contradiction evidence, by
virtue of proving a contradicting fact, shows the witness to be an
unreliable reporter of the contradicted fact.
Since impeachment-by-contradiction evidence undermines a
witness's credibility by virtue of proving a contradictory fact,
there is no way to conceive that the evidence (unlike inconsistent
statement evidence) can attack credibility without also
establishing substantive evidence. Moreover, the rules of
evidence themselves typically require that the impeachment-by-
contradiction evidence be relevant to the issue of guilt at trial in
order not to be excluded as contradictory proof of a "collateral"
76matter. Consequently, absent unusual circumstances,
whenever impeachment-by-contradiction proof is admitted
under the impeachment exception, there will be an overlap
between inferences from the evidence that impeach the
74 See, e.g., 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 37, § 49.
75 See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, EVIDENCE: AN INTRODUCTORY PROBLEM
APPROACH 466-68 (2d ed. 2007).
76 The collateral evidence rule generally prohibits proof that contradicts a witness
on an unimportant matter. A matter substantively relevant to commission of the
crime will never be collateral. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 6.47 (3d ed. 2003). Evidence that is not substantively
relevant will also escape the collateral evidence bar if it establishes more than that
the witness may have been innocently mistaken about the contradicted fact. Id.
[Vol. 86,1017
Truth, Deterrence, and the Impeachment Exception
defendant's credibility and those that, by proving a substantively
relevant fact, may also serve as affirmative proof of guilt.
Nonetheless, the mere fact of an overlap did not render the
suppressed apartment gun inadmissible to impeach Trzaska.
The Court allows admission of suppressed physical evidence to
impeach defendants' trial testimony by contradiction where the
illegally obtained evidence also provides powerful proof of
guilt.77 Indeed, it long ago rejected the opportunity to say that
admission of illegally obtained evidence depends upon its
bearing no permissible evidentiary inference on the issue of
defendant's guilt. In Walder v. United States, the case that
established the impeachment exception, evidentiary principles
themselves happened to limit the use of suppressed physical
evidence to the credibility of the defendant's testimony, and not
allow its use as affirmative proof of guilt.78 After Walder
presented those unusual circumstances, some suggested that the
exception applied only if ordinary evidence principles do not
allow the prosecution to use the proof as affirmative evidence of
guilt. But the Court quickly rejected that suggestion in United
States v. Havens, holding that evidence contradicting defendant's
testimony while bearing permissible inferences as affirmative
proof of guilt is admissible, although subject to a "credibility
only" limiting instruction.79
77 See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 628-29 (1980) (upholding
admission of proof showing possession of the instrumentalities of the crime to
impeach defendant's denial of participation).
78 Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 63-65 (1954). There, the Court admitted
illegally obtained evidence of Walder's previous drug possession to impeach his
direct testimony that he had never used drugs. Id. at 64-65. The Court limited its
use to the credibility of Walder's testimony that he had never possessed drugs. Id.
Even if not obtained illegally, courts would so restrict the evidence since it had no
permissible use as affirmative proof of guilt. Its admission was justified only as a
means of fighting fire with fire: Walder had wrongfully introduced evidence of
specific instances of conduct to prove his character, in violation of FRE 405(a),
entitling the prosecution to rebut it by similar, ordinarily impermissible means. But
all that was necessary to counteract Walder's rule violation and return to the status
quo ante was to neutralize his testimony establishing his good character.
Discounting his testimony that he never possessed drugs was sufficient to undo the
damage; there was no justification for allowing the jury to use the proof of Walder's
prior possession affirmatively to infer subsequent possession of the heroin with
whose possession he was charged.
79 See Havens, 446 U.S. at 624-25 (holding that illegally obtained evidence can be
used to impeach noncollateral as well as collateral matters).
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At the same time, the Havens Court described its
constitutional holding as applying to illegally obtained evidence
whose admission was "otherwise proper., 80  Consequently,
where the "collateral evidence rule" applies to prevent
admission of impeachment proof that contradicts only a
collateral point-i.e., a point that is not relevant to the
substantive issues-it was possible to advance the following
argument: because the impeachment exception requires illegally
obtained evidence to be used only on the issue of witness
credibility and not as affirmative proof of guilt, such evidence
cannot be substantively relevant. As merely contradicting, and
not substantively relevant proof, illegally obtained contradicting
evidence is collateral. Since the constitutional bar prevents
using illegally obtained evidence as affirmative evidence of guilt,
the evidentiary ban against impeachment of a witness on a
collateral matter prevents admission of the illegally obtained
evidence at all. Illegal impeachment-by-contradiction evidence,
permissible to show a witness's contradiction, but not to
establish affirmative evidence of guilt, is stripped of evidentiary
justification. Subject to constitutionally required limited use as
mere credibility evidence, illegal contradicting evidence is no
longer "otherwise admissible" under the rules and therefore
must be excluded.82
Recognizing that rejection of this argument was already
implicit in Havens's admission of impeachment by contradiction
proof (and in many cases decided in its wake), the court in
Tennessee v. Electroplating Inc. explicitly rejected this clever
attempt to use evidentiary principles effectively to prevent
83admission of any impeachment by contradiction evidence.
First, it noted that the impeachment exception "is not limited to
evidence that merely attacks the quality of a defendant's
testimony."' 8  Instead, the cases "clearly authorize the use of
'impeachment' evidence which is relevant to substantive issues
80 Id. at 626.
81 See, for example, State v. Electroplating Inc., 990 S.W.2d 211, 225-26 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1998), where the court considered but rejected the argument in the text.
82 See id. The court recognized that the defendant's attempt to use evidentiary
principles to exclude what Havens allowed was a clever, though futile, attempt to
refight a battle already lost. See id. at 226 & n.17.
83 See id. at 226.
84 1d.
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and which usually implicates the defendant on the ultimate issue
of guilt. ' '85 Only the constitutional rule limits the use of evidence
otherwise admissible on the issue of guilt to the issue of
defendants' credibility.8 6 Consequently, the court noted, there
was no reason to impose on such evidence the requirement that
the evidentiary rules formulated to apply to "credibility-only"
evidence.87 Moreover, if it were necessary to find the evidence
not collateral, "such evidence can be said to be non-collateral for
impeachment purposes." 8  The prohibition against using the
evidence as affirmative proof of guilt did not prohibit its
substantive use to "'disprove a material proposition"' by
contradicting the defendant's testimony about a fact relevant to
guilt.89 By allowing proof of a fact contradicting the exculpatory
fact introduced by defendant's testimony, the impeachment
exception surely allowed the jury to use illegally obtained
evidence as substantive evidence of guilt, even though it was
admonished not to make use of the evidence beyond disproving
the defendant's evidence. The admonition was against using the
proof to advance the case for guilt beyond counteracting
defendant's evidence, not prohibiting reliance on inferences the
evidence may bear on factual propositions relevant to
defendant's guilt. Therefore, there was nothing in the
evidentiary concept of impeachment to prevent proof of
Trzaska's possession of the apartment guns to contradict his
statement to his son claiming intent to part with, and disinterest
in, the guns found in his garage and guns in general.
Just as there was no evidentiary bar on using Trzaska's
possession of the apartment guns to contradict his claimed
disinterest in the garage guns, there was no evidentiary bar
against using the suppressed statements to prove their contents.
The entire discussion of the degree of inconsistency between the
statements and Trzaska's hearsay declaration was premised
upon the assumption that their only impeaching effect lay in
their showing an inconsistency "'that has a reasonable bearing on
85 Id.
86 See id.
87 Id. at 226 n.17.
88 Id.
89 Id. (quoting COHEN, PAINE, & SHEPPERD, TENNESSEE LAW OF EVIDENCE §
613.5 (1995)).
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credibility.' 9  But that simply was not so. First, Trzaska's
statements were admissions of a party opponent and admissible
to prove any facts asserted therein.9' Second, Trzaska's
admissions to being addicted to guns and to possessing (at least)
the apartment guns impeached his hearsay declaration of
disinterest in guns by contradiction in a manner identical to the
physical proof of his possession of the apartment guns.
Limiting the impeaching effect of his statements to their value
as inconsistent statements, as if they were inadmissible to prove
what they asserted, again confused making "substantive" and
"affirmative" use of the illegally obtained statements. Just as
there was no bar to making substantive use of the illegally seized
apartment guns to show possession of the garage guns, there was
no such limitation on the substantive use of the statements to
show the possession of apartment guns directly or indirectly
through Trzaska's continuing obsession with guns. As with the
nonstatement proof of Trzaska's possession of the apartment
guns, the cases only prevented the jury from relying upon the
statements when deciding whether the prosecution, in the
absence of Trzaska's hearsay declaration, had carried its burden.
The jury was free to decide that the statements, by showing his
continuing obsession with and possession of guns, contradicted
Trzaska's claimed disinterest in guns generally and intent to part
with the guns with whose possession he was charged.
After Trzaska offered his statement to his son to show his
intent to part with and disinterest in the garage guns, any
evidence suggesting that he possessed them, including that he
admitted to being an addict obsessed with guns and was in
simultaneous possession of other guns, was admissible
impeachment-by-contradiction proof. As an addict obsessed
with guns, Trzaska may have been a notoriously unreliable
reporter of his intent not to exercise control over objects of his
obsession within his reach.92 Moreover, continued possession of
90 United States v. Trzaska (Trzaska II), 111 F.3d 1019, 1025 (2d Cir. 1997)
(quoting 28 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6203, at 514 (1993)).
91 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A).
92 Cf Halvorsen v. Baird, 146 F.3d 680, 686 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding plaintiff's
alcoholism admissible to impeach his denial that he had been drinking, as denial is a
characteristic of alcoholism so that an alcoholic's "testimony that he was not drunk
could be subjectively truthful, yet false").
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and obsession with guns may have shown that Trzaska's
professed intent to surrender the guns was nothing more than a
way to placate his son or a ploy to get him to retrieve them for
him from Trzaska's friend. By tending to prove the subsequent
possession of garage guns, the illegally obtained evidence also
tended to show that Trzaska simply did not have the attitude
toward the guns that he reported when he spoke to his son. This
is so whether the evidence consisted of his simultaneous
possession of the illegally seized apartment guns or the
suppressed admission that he possessed those guns and/or was
addicted to guns.
Nonetheless, the likelihood that the jury would use the
illegally obtained evidence affirmatively despite the courts'
limiting its use to Trzaska's credibility led them to find a way to
restrict the substantive inferences for which it could be used.
While admitting the evidence, the district court instructed the
jury to consider the seized apartment guns only insofar as they
provided a "context" for Trzaska's suppressed statement and
further instructed them to consider the statement only for its
bearing on whether Trzaska spoke truthfully to his son.93 The
instruction was designed to allow the jury to use the illegally
obtained evidence only to discount Trzaska's hearsay
declaration; in other words, to "neutralize" the evidence of
Trzaska's hearsay declaration and so decide the case as if they
heard neither it nor the illegally obtained proof.
Still, the relevance of the evidence as impeachment-by-
contradiction proof, even if used only to neutralize Trzaska's
evidence, depended on its value as substantive proof that
Trzaska had possessed the garage guns. Possession requires "the
power and intention to exercise control over the firearm., 94 The
guns' location in Trzaska's garage clearly established his power
to control them, and the crucial issue was thus whether he
intended to control them. Evidence that Trzaska continued to
possess and to be obsessed with guns after speaking to his son
cast doubt on the credibility of his claimed disinterest in, and
intent to dissociate himself from, the guns whose retrieval he
asked his son to accomplish.
93 United States v. Trzaska (Trzaska 1), 885 F. Supp. 46, 47-48 (E.D.N.Y. 1995),
rev'd, 111 F.3d 1019 (2d Cir. 1997).
94 See 2 LEONARD SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-
CRIMINAL § 35.07 (2007) (Instructions 35-49).
2007]
OREGON LAW REVIEW
There was ample precedent simply to pretend that a limiting
instruction would prevent affirmative use of the illegally
obtained evidence that, while impeaching the defendant's
testimony, was also highly probative on the issue of guilt.
Nonetheless, the circuit court was apparently unwilling to simply
follow that precedent in a setting that extended the
impeachment exception to nontestifying defendants' hearsay
declarations.
James had drawn a line between impeachment of defendants
and defense witnesses to limit the occasions upon which the
prosecution might use illegally obtained evidence.95  That
restraint might easily be obliterated if a defense witness's
testimony about a defendant's words or conduct invited
impeachment whenever they bore an exculpatory hearsay
inference, and one could not rely upon the jury to avoid making
affirmative use of the impeachment proof. The likelihood that
the jury would remember what the illegally obtained evidence
showed of Trzaska's possession when assessing the credibility of
his stated intent not to do so anymore, and yet forget what it
showed of Trzaska's possession when deciding whether the
government carried its burden on that issue is remote. One
might imagine that the issue would come down to a single
decision about what the evidence showed of Trzaska's intent at
the relevant time without necessarily considering whether the
illegally obtained evidence showed it directly or through a
judgment about the credibility of Trzaska's statement made a
year earlier.
Consequently, the Second Circuit, skeptical about whether
any substantive evidence of Trzaska's gun possession would not
be used as affirmative proof of guilt, sought a way to separate
using the illegally obtained evidence to assess the credibility of
Trzaska's hearsay statement from using it as proof of possession
at all.9 To do so, the appellate court took the trial court's focus
on the statement, rather than the seized guns, one step further.
Where the trial court had been willing to allow Trzaska's
"admission that he suffered from a narcotic-like addiction to
guns '"9 to be used to cast doubt on whether Trzaska reliably
95 See James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 313 (1990).
96 See United States v. Trzaska (Trzaska II), 111 F.3d 1019, 1025 (2d Cir. 1997).
97 Trzaska 1, 885 F. Supp. at 47.
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reported to his son that he "didn't want nothing [sic] to do with
[guns] anymore," 98 the Second Circuit treated Trzaska's
"addiction" statement as if its only impeachment value were as
an inconsistent statement.99 Treating the statement as if it were
not admissible for the truth of the matter asserted, the court
focused exclusively on the inconsistency between Trzaska's
admitted addiction while possessing the apartment guns on the
one hand, and his intention to abandon the garage guns to his
son on the other.'0° Thus recast, the illegally obtained evidence
was not substantive proof of a desire for guns admissible to cast
doubt on his claimed disinterest in the garage guns. Instead, it
was merely a statement about possessing the apartment guns and
being addicted to guns whose probative value depended entirely
upon there being sufficient inconsistency with his claimed
disinterest in the garage guns to show that he had "blown hot
and cold" on the specific subject of his interest in them. 0 1
Eliminating factual inferences that followed from Trzaska's
addiction to guns and simultaneous possession of the apartment
guns, the court then inquired about what the inconsistency with
the suppressed statement showed regarding whether Trzaska
had spoken falsely to his son. 10 2 Although Trzaska's hearsay
declaration asserted he was abandoning the garage guns because
he no longer wanted to be involved with any guns, the court read
103it narrowly as a disavowal of interest only in the garage guns.
Thus, a subsequent statement about possession of different guns
or an admitted addiction to guns was not "necessar[ily]
inconsistent" with abandonment of the specific guns with whose
possession he was charged.' °4 Even then, however, the court
acknowledged that inconsistent statements need not be
"'diametrically opposed.' '1 0 5  That the statements were not
98 Id.
99 See Trzaska II, 111 F.3d at 1025.
100 Id.
101 See id.. The court noted that its admission depended upon a "'variance
between the statement and the testimony that has a reasonable bearing on
credibility."' Id. (quoting 28 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 90, § 6203, at 514).
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 1024 (quoting United States v. Agajanian, 852 F.2d 56, 58 (2d Cir.
1988)).
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necessarily inconsistent with an earlier intent to abandon the
garage guns did not mean that they failed to establish an
inconsistency sufficient to establish Trzaska an unreliable
reporter of that intent. Nonetheless, the court found it
significant that the statements were made a year apart, as
"[c]onsidering the changing nature of a person's subjective
intent, this time lapse clouds [the] inconsistency. '' 1°6 The court
concluded that the statements were "insufficiently inconsistent
to allow Trzaska to be impeached." 1°7
To reach that conclusion, the court applied a narrower
conception of how an inconsistent statement affects credibility
than evidence rules require. Inconsistent statement
impeachment is a form of "specific impeachment." Specific
impeachment communicates to the fact finder what testimony to
doubt but not necessarily why to doubt it. In the case of
inconsistent statement impeachment, the fact that a witness has
spoken inconsistently on a subject suggests that the witness is an
unreliable reporter on that subject, but does not necessarily
show why the witness is unreliable. Unreliability, as shown by
the inconsistent statement, is perfectly consistent with a defect in
any of the witness's testimonial capacities of perception,
memory, narration, or sincerity. Even viewing Trzaska's
suppressed statement exclusively as an inconsistent statement
questioning his testimonial capacities, the changed attitude
toward the guns he expressed was surely sufficient to raise a
question about whether he spoke reliably about his desire not to
control the guns.
Nonetheless, the court ignored what the inconsistency showed
about Trzaska's reliability on that subject generally and focused
exclusively on what it showed about whether he intentionally
misrepresented his intent to his son. 108 Noting that Trzaska may
simply have changed his mind about the guns while truthfully
reporting his attitude at the times he spoke, the court found his
suppressed statement "insufficiently inconsistent" because it
may have truthfully reported the "changing nature of [Trzaska's]
subjective intent."1°9 Citing a test for inconsistency that focused
106 Id. at 1025.
107 Id.
108 See id.
109 Id.
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exclusively on whether an inconsistent statement showed that a
witness did not "'believe[] the truth of the facts testified to' -
that is, intentionally misrepresented-the court found that the
subsequent statement did not merit admission because it was
insufficiently probative that he had lied when he reported his
intention to dissociate himself from the guns."'
The court's focus on Trzaska's sincerity to the exclusion of the
other testimonial capacities ignored the possible ways that his
shifting description of his attitude toward the guns undermined
his credibility as a reporter of his intentions about them, even if
he had sincerely reported his feeling at the moment he spoke.
That Trzaska had expressed contradictory attitudes toward the
guns, from a desire to be rid of them to an uncontrollable desire
for them, suggested that he could not reliably distinguish a firm
intention from a fleeting feeling regarding their possession and,
perhaps having distinguished those mental states, accurately
communicate them. The inconsistent statement thus impeached
Trzaska's capacities for perception and narration on this topic as
well as his insincerity. There was nothing in evidence law to
prevent its use for this purpose, even assuming that the
statement could be admitted only as an inconsistent statement
and not used substantively to establish the desire for guns that it
confessed. In the end, the appellate court excluded the proof
because its probative value on the issue of whether Trzaska's
hearsay declaration was a deliberate lie was insufficient, even
though it surely provided some support for that inference."
2
The court balked at simply admitting the evidence for this as
well as the substantive impeachment purposes because the proof
also proved Trzaska's guilt by affirmatively establishing his
intent to control the guns at the relevant time rather than by
neutralizing evidence of his earlier intent to relinquish them."
3
Exclusion was undoubtedly a plausible product of the court's
conscientious attempt to assure that some deterrence flowed
from compliance with the constitutional mandate that illegally
obtained evidence be used only to impeach Trzaska, and not as
110 Id. (quoting 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 37, § 34, at 115)
(emphasis added).
111 See id.
112 See id.
113 See id.
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affirmative evidence of guilt, considering that the jury would
most naturally use the evidence as proof of possession.
Therefore, unlike the trial court, which was willing to rely on a
limiting instruction, however ineffective, to satisfy the
constitutional mandate, the appellate court opted for exclusion
where it felt that the risk of affirmative use-direct proof of
possession irrespective of Trzaska's exculpatory statement-was
too great. This was hardly an implausible result as a matter of
salvaging constitutional deterrence policy.
Excluding the illegally obtained evidence, however, did not
follow from evidentiary rules. Once he had offered his hearsay
declaration of disinterest in the garage guns, there was nothing
in those rules suggesting that the physical evidence and
Trzaska's statements were not admissible impeachment to cast
doubt on that disinterest, however they may do so. Nor was
there anything to suggest that Trzaska's statements, if examined
only for their inconsistency, were inadmissible to show his
unreliability as a reporter of his desire to exercise control over
the guns in ways besides showing that he lied. Finally, even if it
were necessary for the inconsistency to show that Trzaska's
hearsay declaration was an intentional lie, there was nothing in
the surrounding circumstances that eliminated that possibility,
and, indeed, much that supported it.
Despite all this, one could hardly fault the court for offering
evidentiary reasons to exclude the proof. Rather than explain
particular limits on impeachment by deterrence analysis, the
Supreme Court has said that whether a witness is speaking
untruthfully is an especially important component of assuring
fact-finding accuracy when justifying limits on the use of illegally
obtained impeachment.'14 According to the court's reasoning,
the fact that the illegally obtained evidence allowed a substantial
possibility that Trzaska spoke truthfully showed that his
impeachment was unwarranted. Nevertheless, by focusing only
on whether Trzaska lied, the court unwittingly demonstrated
how far the Supreme Court's focus on whether a witness has
114 For example, the James Court considered the lesser possibility that defense
witnesses would lie, James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 314 (1990), but did not consider
how their honestly mistaken testimony (immune from rebuttal with illegally
obtained evidence) might impede accurate fact finding far more significantly than
defendants' obviously self-serving lies.
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spoken the truth deviates from normal evidentiary impeachment
processes concerned with enabling juries to find the truth.
The Trzaska II court excluded the evidence because it did not
sufficiently contradict Trzaska's stated attitude toward the
garage guns at the moment he expressed it to his son.11 5 It thought
that, even considering the illegally obtained evidence, there was
a substantial possibility that he had reported a sincerely felt
intention to abandon the garage guns and be done with all
guns.116  That Trzaska may have subsequently changed his
attitude toward the guns between the time he spoke and the time
he was found with them in his garage undermined the court's
confidence that he spoke insincerely and therefore justified
prohibiting his impeachment.
From the perspective of fact-finding accuracy, however, the
singular focus on whether Trzaska expressed a sincerely felt (but
perhaps fleeting) desire to abandon the guns when he spoke to
his son reflects a stunning reversal of priorities. The analysis has
it exactly backwards; what matters in the case is Trzaska's intent
at the time the guns were found in the garage. Indeed, by
preventing the prosecution from using the illegally seized
evidence to show that Trzaska had changed his mind, as well as
to cast doubt on his previously claimed intent, the court refused
to allow the prosecution to use the evidence to contradict the
very inferences upon whose relevance Trzaska's hearsay
declaration depended.
Trzaska's intent toward the guns when he spoke to his son was
relevant only if one inferred from it subsequent action bearing
on his intent to control the guns when they were found in the
garage, such as surrendering them to his son, or continuity in his
attitude toward the guns between the time when he spoke to his
son and when the guns were found. Any evidence that
contradicted the inference that Trzaska had acted on his intent
to be through with guns by relinquishing them to his son, or that
he still felt as he said he did about them, contradicted the
inferences required to make his hearsay declaration relevant to
his possession of the guns when they were found in the garage.
Therefore, from the perspective of finding the truth, what
mattered was not just the possibility that Trzaska had truthfully
115 See Trzaska I1, 111 F.3d at 1025.
116 See id.
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described a momentary attitude toward the guns a year before
they were found in his garage, but whether Trzaska's hearsay
declaration accurately described an attitude that he still held at
the time when he was charged with their possession.
From a truth-finding perspective, the lapse of time between
Trzaska's statements had the exact opposite effect than that
suggested by the court. If anything, the passage of time
increased the likelihood that Trzaska's earlier-described intent
was not an accurate depiction of his attitude when he was
charged. What mattered was the proximity in time of physical
control over the guns whose possession Trzaska denied, the
admitted addiction to guns, and the possession of other guns, not
the length of time between those events and his statement to his
son. That those events were simultaneous and current, while the
statement to his son was a year old, made the inference from the
fresh evidence that much more probative for rebuttal. It
disproved the continuity in Trzaska's attitude by showing his
intent to control the guns at the relevant time-when charged
with their possession-rather than his attitude at a remote time
whose relevance depended upon its continuance.
The exclusive focus on whether Trzaska spoke truthfully
discounted the impeachment value of the evidence showing that
he had been unable to act upon his expressed intent to part with
the guns or to maintain his resolve to avoid them. It led the
court to consider Trzaska's statement only as an assertion about
his state of mind at the time he spoke, rather than for its relevant
inference as evidence about his state of mind when the guns
were discovered. The trial court, recognizing that Trzaska's
statement obviously was offered to show that "he was no longer
involved with guns" and so "not illegally in possession of the
firearms as charged," allowed the prosecution to use the illegally
obtained evidence to challenge the credibility of the statement as
proof of Trzaska's state of mind at the relevant time.17
In contrast, the appellate court focused on the credibility of
Trzaska's statement as proof of what it literally described, not its
credibility as proof of the inferences that made it relevant.8
The court immunized Trzaska's hearsay declaration from
117 United States v. Trzaska (Trzaska 1), 885 F. Supp. 46, 47 (E.D.N.Y. 1995),
rev'd, 111 F.3d 1019 (2d Cir. 1997).
118 See Trzaska II, 111 F.3d at 1025.
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contradiction because the illegally obtained evidence, although
rebutting the declaration's only probative value in the case,
potentially did so without necessarily showing the declaration to
be false. Arguably, this narrow reading was required to salvage
deterrence by assuring that the prosecution did not use the
evidence to establish guilt beyond "neutralizing" Trzaska's
statement or attacking his (as opposed to his evidence's or
another witness's) credibility. But whatever reason there might
be for allowing false inferences from Trzaska's (possibly) true
words to pass without rebuttal could have nothing to do with
accurate fact finding.
The analysis shows how the extent of constitutional
deterrence beyond exclusion in the prosecution's case-in-chief
has become dependent upon manipulation of the ambiguous
concept of truth seeking endorsed by the Court. Exclusion of
the illegally obtained evidence to impeach Trzaska's hearsay
declaration required progressive narrowing of the impeachment
purposes for which it could be used that had no basis in
evidentiary law. It also required the court to parse the statement
closely to distinguish between using the illegally obtained
evidence to show Trzaska's statement false (allowed) or
unreliable evidence of the point for which it was offered (not
allowed). Even then, the substantial overlap between the
remaining permissible and impermissible impeachment uses
potentially allowed admission of the evidence pursuant to
ineffective, if not incoherent, limiting instructions or exclusion of
what, despite all the limitations imposed, was still highly
probative impeachment.
Nor was Trzaska at all unique in this regard. Virtually all
post-James cases supporting exclusion rely, to some extent, on
similar evidentiary distortions to limit factual inferences from
illegally obtained impeachment and manipulate the result to
appear consistent with truth seeking. After all, the lower courts
are required to play with the cards that the Supreme Court dealt.
For example, in People v. Trujillo, a prosecution for failing to
appear, the court disallowed impeachment use of a defendant's
suppressed admission that he was fleeing police because he
understood that there was a warrant out for his arrest." 9 The
prosecution offered his statement after his wife testified that
119 People v. Trujillo, 49 P.3d 316, 318 (Colo. 2002).
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Trujillo, although accustomed to telling her of his next court
date for entry onto a calendar she kept for him, either did not
tell her anything about the date he subsequently missed or told
her the date that she recorded incorrectly. 120  In addition,
Trujillo's wife and mother testified about his poor memory and
learning disorder making it difficult for him to keep track of
appointments himself.121 The court disallowed the impeachment,
relying on James's holding that extending the exception to
witnesses other than the defendant would "undermine the
deterrent effect" of the exclusionary rule and not "promote the
truth-seeking function of the court.' ' 122  Nevertheless, as in
Trzaska, the former rationale was completely lost in the attempt
to rationalize the latter.
The Trujillo court spent most of the opinion arguing that the
impeachment exception forbade using Trujillo's statements to
impeach his wife and mother because it does not allow using a
defendant's statements as substantive evidence. 23 If not used for
their truth, it argued, a defendant's prior statements are relevant
only to impeach by inconsistent statement; they show, at most,
that he has contradicted himself, not that the facts asserted in his
statements are true. Consequently, they are admissible only if
the defendant testifies. Meanwhile, unless used as proof of facts
they assert, a defendant's statements have no impeaching effect
at all on the testimony of other defense witnesses. Denied
substantive use, the defendant's statements are not admissible to
.1. .. 124
impeach those witnesses by contradiction. According to the
court, the Supreme Court prohibits all substantive use of
defendant's suppressed statements, not just their use as
affirmative evidence Of guilt. 2 5 Consequently, "impeachment"
has a special meaning for purposes of the exception that, while
allowing the prosecutor to use a defendant's statements to show
inconsistency with his testimony, does not allow him to use the
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 324 (citing James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1990)).
123 See id. at 319-26.
124 Id. at 325. ("Logic tells us that only the speaker of the statement may be
impeached in this way, that is, by her own prior inconsistent statements. Hence, if
the defendant does not testify, then she cannot be impeached by her own earlier
inconsistent statement.").
125 See id. at 320 n.3 (citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)).
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statements as impeachment-by-contradiction evidence of facts
contradicting the testimony of other witnesses.126 This erroneous
reading of the Court's impeachment exception jurisprudence
seems even to have been enshrined in Colorado law where
unlawfully obtained statements are used as examples of
statements limited to nonhearsay use.t27 However, it is without
support in the Supreme Court's cases that, while enjoining courts
to limit illegally obtained evidence to impeachment uses,
routinely allow contradicting evidence and therefore support no
arbitrary limitation on statement evidence in this regard.
More critically, the court rested exclusion of Trujillo's
statements on this flimsiest of evidentiary premises to combat
what amounted to a major assault on James. The prosecution in
Trujillo advanced the novel claim that the prohibition of defense
witness impeachment applied only to evidence that was the
product of Fourth Amendment violations (as in James), not Fifth
Amendment violations (as in Trujillo).12" But rather than
respond that there was no precedent at all distinguishing the
two, much less allowing impeachment of defense witnesses with
Miranda-violative statements, or that the suggested result would
undercut the deterrence James promised, the court spoke mostly
about how substantive use to rebut the defense witnesses would
fail to provide adequate truth-seeking benefits.1
29
Saddled with James's reasoning, perhaps the court did its best.
It suggested that admitting Trujillo's statement might prevent
him from presenting his "best defense" and do "little to limit
126 See id. at 320.
127 See id.. Colorado does not seem alone in this regard. See, e.g., McCracken v.
State, 820 A.2d 593, 601-02 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003). Maryland law, for example,
prohibits the jury from using a defendant's suppressed statements elicited during
cross-examination or rebuttal as substantive evidence. See id. Consequently, it is
error to admit those statements without so instructing the jury or to allow their
proof with extrinsic evidence unless the defendant is first given an opportunity to
explain or deny them. See id.
128 For ease of reference, this Article refers only to statements taken in violation
of Miranda and not statements obtained involuntarily when mentioning Fifth
Amendment violations. The impeachment exception does not apply to the latter.
The use of involuntary statements against the maker amounts to compelled self-
incrimination, not just a violation of Miranda's prophylactic rule. See, e.g., Mincey
v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397-98 (1978) (prohibiting use of involuntary statements
to impeach defendant).
129 See Trujillo, 49 P.3d at 322-26.
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perjury at trial."'3 ° But it was no better than the Trzaska court at
deploying the Court's flawed reasoning that only perjured
testimony (to which only defendants are likely to resort) will
interfere with fact finding. Thus the Trujillo court could not
explain why its reasons were sufficient to exclude, in the name of
accurate fact finding, evidence that clearly would be admissible if
obtained lawfully. For that, the court could only fall back onto
the erroneous claim that using Trujillo's statements to impeach
his wife "does not meet the definition of impeachment.'
131
The three concurring justices' response to the Trujillo
majority further demonstrated the adverse consequences of
truth seeking's usurpation of deterrence in analysis of the
exclusionary rule's scope at trial. First, the concurring opinion
correctly recognized that the impeachment exception did not
separately define "impeachment" to exclude contradiction,
thereby requiring the defendant's statements to be used only to
show self-contradiction. 132  Absent deterrence considerations,
the exception allowed their use to contradict defense
133
witnesses. Next, however, the concurrence acceded to the
prosecution's request to allow impeachment of defense witnesses
with the defendant's suppressed statements without referring to
James's discussion of deterrence at all! 134  In its place, the
opinion offered more evidentiary sleight of hand.
According to the concurrence, despite James, one could
blithely allow contradiction of defense witnesses with a
defendant's statements because illegally obtained evidence can
be used to contradict "only if it presents a direct conflict or
contradiction with the witness's trial testimony.' ' 135  So, the
opinion concluded, "the defendant's statement that he actually
knew he was to appear in court on the day in question,36
130 Id. at 324.
131 Id. at 325.
132 Id. at 327 (Coats, J., concurring).
133 See id. at 328.
134 See id. at 326-29.
135 Id. at 329 (emphasis added). The court cited no federal case for this
proposition nor did it attempt to square the result with the Court's allowance of
impeachment of testimony elicited on cross-examination that was reasonably
suggested by the direct, a rule which puts the directness of the contradiction into the
prosecutor's hands.
136 Id.
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although otherwise admissible to impeach his wife and mother,
failed the direct contradiction test because it "in no way
conflicted with or made any less true or accurate his mother's
testimony concerning his history of poor memory or his wife's
testimony about her usual practice of recording his court dates,
which was not done in this case.' 3 7 Exclusion of the evidence to
impeach defense witnesses was therefore entirely dependent
upon a decision about how directly the suppressed proof
contradicted those witnesses.
The opinion then asserted, without explanation, that the
requirement of a direct contradiction would mean
"impeachment of another witness with the defendant's excluded
custodial statements should rarely become an issue unless the
testimony involves contradictory representations of the
defendant himself.' ' 138 As in Trzaska, however, the "directness"
of the contradiction reflected nothing more than a hunch about
the suppressed proof's ability to show that the witnesses spoke
falsely (perhaps intentionally so) rather than provided testimony
that, in the absence of the suppressed proof, supported a false
conclusion. By attempting to focus exclusively on the former,
the opinion similarly insulated the very inference that made the
testimony of Trujillo's witnesses relevant-he was unaware of
the specific court date for which he failed to appear-from
suppressed evidence that directly contradicted the inference, if
not the testimony itself.
The opinion also showed that "directness," as in Trzaska I
and II, was a matter of degree in the eye of the beholder. Surely
Trujillo's admittedly accurate memory of his scheduled hearing
date cast doubt upon whether he had failed to follow his practice
of informing his wife of the date or whether she had not
recorded it correctly; it even cast doubt on his mother's
testimony that he had a poor memory and was unable to keep
track of his appointments.13 9 In fact, it was entirely plausible that
the indirectness of the contradiction was a consequence of the
witnesses' (or counsel's) understanding about what they could
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Moreover, if impeachment of defense witnesses were allowed to promote
truth finding, it obviously should not matter whether they spoke falsely or whether
the defendant used their evidence to support a false inference.
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testify to without opening the door to the suppressed evidence
rather than an indicium of the testimony's veracity.
Attaching the fate of exclusion to truth seeking could be
expected to create no more effective a limit for impeachment of
defense witnesses than it had for defendants. There was no
reason to think that a direct contradiction requirement would
effectively eliminate impeachment of defense witnesses, but not
defendants. Truth seeking would demand admission of the
suppressed evidence subject to instruction that it be used only to
impeach the credibility of the defense witnesses and not as
affirmative evidence of guilt, just as it did when defendants were
impeached.
In all the sturm und drang about how inapt evidentiary
notions of impeachment and truth seeking might determine
allowable impeachment of other defense witnesses, the Trujillo
court lost sight of the basic deterrence rationale for James.
Consequently, it missed the central point that whatever effect
James might have on prosecutorial behavior would dissipate if
the court extended the exception to impeachment of
nontestifying defendants' exculpatory words or conduct. It
recognized that most courts have extended the exception to
allow impeachment of defendants' hearsay declarations and
statements made to experts who rely upon them in forming theirS• 140
opinions. Moreover, like many such courts, the Trujillo
majority characterized these extensions as "narrow" exceptions
to the "rule" preventing use of illegally obtained evidence if the
defendant does not testify.'41  But the narrowness of these
exceptions to the rule of exclusion is as problematic as the
chimerical view that invocation of evidentiary concepts rooted in
fact-finding accuracy will costlessly create the required
deterrence of constitutional violations.
Although the Trujillo court was "not called upon to address
either of these circumstances here,, 142 it was not at all clear why
that was so. Perhaps the prosecutor had not urged the point, but
if Trujillo's failure to report his scheduled court date came in the
context of an agreement with his wife that he report all such
appointments, it was hardly evident that it was not hearsay
140 See Trujillo, 49 P.3d at 325.
141 See id.
142 Id.
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inviting his impeachment. As this Part shows, once the
credibility of a nontestifying defendant's statement is implicated,
all that prevents its contradiction with illegally obtained
evidence is the patently false, and thus completely manipulable,
equation between the statement's potential impact on fact-
finding accuracy and the sincerity with which it was possibly
made. That makes James's quest for additional deterrence
depend entirely upon whether a meaningful limit on the use of
excluded evidence subsists in the idea that prosecutors can
impeach nontestifying defendants' exculpatory words and
conduct only when they implicate their "credibility." It is to that
question that the Article now turns.
IV
DISTORTING EVIDENCE LAW TO JUSTIFY THE IMPEACHMENT
OF NONTESTIFYING CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
The case for extending the impeachment exception to
nontestifying defendants' words and conduct follows logically
from the doctrine making defendants' "credibility" the
gravaman of the exception in the service of truth seeking. First,
a defendant's credibility is no less relevant when he offers his
hearsay declaration than when he testifies.143  Similarly, a
defendant's credibility is no less relevant when the probative
value of exculpatory testimony offered by a defense witness
depends upon the truthfulness of a defendant's statement, even
if that statement is not used in a fashion that qualifies as a
hearsay use.'" Second, as far as truth seeking justifies the
impeachment exception, the doctrine should allow impeachment
of a nontestifying defendant's statements whenever his
credibility may affect their probative value.
In that respect, the defendant's out-of-court statement is
indistinguishable from testimony. 145 So far, no court has rejected
143 See cases cited supra note 31.
144 See cases cited supra note 32.
145 One might construe the "credibility" requirement for impeachment with
illegally obtained evidence as concerned with whether verdicts are informed by
perjury in its technical sense of lying under oath and therefore find that out of court
statements not made under oath are immune from impeachment. That there is no
indication in the cases that this argument has ever been made, much less accepted,
is further evidence that the exception is understood to pursue truth telling as a
means to truth finding, rather than for its own sake.
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the truth-seeking argument for allowing impeachment of
defendant's hearsay statements pursuant to FRE 806 (and also
impeachment of statements made to experts upon whose truth
the experts relied in forming a conclusion about the defendant's
culpability), as long as the statements are admitted subject to a
"defendant's credibility" limiting instruction of some kmd.
The only case to reject the prosecution's attempt to impeach a
defendant's hearsay declaration remains Trzaska H, which
disallowed the impeachment after assuming no per se bar against
impeachment of defendants' hearsay declarations, thus
disallowing it for reasons apart from whether the defendant's
statement was offered as hearsay or as live testimony.147
From a deterrence perspective, the move from impeaching
defendants' testimony to impeaching nontestifying defendants'
out-of-court statements appears quite different. Any evidentiary
categorization used to define how or when illegally obtained
evidence can be used at trial will create a boundary between
exclusion and admission that is arbitrary, at least at the edges,
from the perspective of deterrence. Only an extraordinary
fortuity would cause the boundary between permitted and
prohibited evidentiary uses of illegally obtained proof to map
exactly onto the exigencies and incentives of criminal
investigation. So as a means of assuring that, as James requires,
there be some truth seeking and some deterrence beyond that
engendered by the case-in-chief prohibition, an easily
administered rule allowing illegally obtained evidence to
impeach only a testifying defendant is perfectly plausible.
Moreover, if the exception is truly intended to prevent a
defendant from taking advantage of the exclusionary rule to
offer "perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's
disability to challenge his credibility," 148 the objection does not
extend to false out-of-court statements that are neither
testimony (because not made in court) nor perjurious (because
not made under oath).
Nonetheless, the lure of truth seeking is strong, considering
that the doctrine encourages the lower courts to seek an optimal
146 See cases cited supra notes 31-32.
147 See United States v. Trzaska (Trzaska II), 111 F.3d 1019, 1024-25 (2d Cir.
1997).
148 Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (emphasis added).
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point at which they can promote both fact-finding accuracy and
deterrence without expense to the other. Consider, for example,
the fate of the dissent in Wilkes v. United States, in which Judge
Farrell disagreed with the court's allowing impeachment of a
defense psychiatrist with a defendant's suppressed statements.
14 9
Of all the opinions on the subject, Judge Farrell's came closest to
arguing that, simply for deterrence reasons, James should be
read categorically to prohibit using illegally obtained evidence if
the defendant does not testify."5° He reasoned that the truth-
seeking benefit of allowing the impeachment in Wilkes would be
no greater than that declined by the James majority and
therefore could not be distinguished on that basis.
15
1
In response, the Wilkes majority labeled such an approach
"wooden," saying that reading James to place the categorical
prohibition of defense witness impeachment ahead of its
balancing approach was to elevate form over substance and
thereby forego the further truth-seeking benefits that accrue
when courts do not treat defense witnesses "as a homogenous
group., 5 2  Properly viewed, James allows impeaching the
defense psychiatrist with illegally obtained evidence
contradicting what the defendant told him because truth seeking
and deterrence may be simultaneously achieved. As the Wilkes
majority put it:
The exception enables defendants to testify truthfully and
avoid admission of the suppressed evidence, provided they do
not open the door by contradicting the suppressed evidence.
Hence the impeachment exception, properly applied,
accommodates competing societal and individual interests.
5 3
According to the court's reasoning, the impeachment
exception applies to defendant's statements because it does not
compromise deterrence. The threat of impeachment deters only
untruthful testimony, and therefore any diminished deterrence is
justified by truth-seeking benefits. Since no required deterrence
of unlawful conduct is diminished, the exception
"accommodates" both goals. Meanwhile, although James
149 Wilkes v. United States, 631 A.2d 880, 891 (D.C. 1993) (Farrell, J., dissenting).
150 See id. at 891-92.
151 Id. at 893 n.2.
152 Id. at 887 (majority opinion).
153 Id. at 888.
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seemingly foreclosed extending that argument to defense
witnesses because untrammeled impeachment would
unacceptably reduce deterrence, it nonetheless minimized, if not
denied, the truth-seeking cost of prohibiting their
impeachment.15 4  Unsurprisingly, therefore, courts applying
James seized on its Panglossian claim that "rebuttal of a defense
witness 'would not further... truth-seeking"' rather than relying
on its deterrence prong to justify the inevitable compromise of
truth-seeking that occurs when evidence is excluded only
because it was obtained illegally.
155
That truth seeking's support for prohibiting defense witness
impeachment is more than a harmless pretense was manifest
when prosecutors sought to extend the exception to allow
impeachment of nontestifying defendants. Shortly after James,
the court in State v. Brooks declined to allow impeachment of a
nontestifying defendant's denial of ownership of a bag of cocaine/. 156
with his suppressed confession of ownership. It said that the
exculpatory statement, like the defendant's hair color in James,
was "a directly observed event ...which ...is sought to be
contradicted by an illegally obtained ... statement," and so "no
principled distinction can be drawn between James and this
case."
,15
7
Nonetheless, since Brooks relied on James's truth-seeking
prong, it was easy to show the opinion manifestly wrong as
applied to defendants' hearsay declarations. As subsequent
courts were quick to point out, the argument that truth seeking
does not require extending the exception to impeach
presumptively truthful defense witnesses does not apply where
the probative force of the observed event depends upon the
154 The Court asserts that defense witnesses whose testimony is immune from
potential impeachment will nonetheless testify truthfully because they (unlike
defendants) are discouraged from testifying falsely by the prospect of perjury
charges. See James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 314 (1990). The Court also asserts that
allowing the impeachment of defense witnesses will not deter only untruthful
testimony because defendants, uncertain whether defense witnesses will confine
their testimony to avoid opening the door to illegally obtained proof, will forego
their probative exculpatory evidence. Id.
155 State v. Brooks, No. 92-1982-CR-Fr, 1992 WL 380886, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App.
Dec. 23, 1992) (alteration in original).
156 Id.
157 Id.
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veracity of the defendant.158 Nothing prevents a defense witness
who truthfully reports what a defendant says from introducing a
false statement on which the jury may rely. The defense
witness's susceptibility to a potential perjury charge is no
protection from the defendant's mendacity. And the
defendant's false statement as reported by his witness may
undermine factual accuracy as significantly as the defendant's
false testimony. So if a "principled distinction" failed to exist
between impeaching nontestifying defendants' statements and
events such as those in James, it would have to be because the
need for deterrence was indistinguishable, not because there was
no potential difference in their impact on truth seeking as
understood by James.
The possibility that deterrence might justify similar treatment
of these "observed events" received short shrift. Instead, courts
assumed that if impeachment of defendants' testimony generates
truth-seeking benefits without exacting unacceptable deterrence
costs, the impeachment of defendants' hearsay statements should
not be any different. 159  Similarly, courts reasoned that
impeachment of defense experts' opinions about defendants'
culpability based on the credibility of defendants' statements,
would also exact no additional deterrence cost while preventing
the defendant from speaking falsely to the experts.160 One court
put it in three rather simple propositions: truth-seeking isS16112
advanced, by preventing the defendant from lying,162 while
deterrence does not suffer, because the defendant can always
avoid the illegally obtained evidence by speaking truthfully.
163
158 The prosecution in Brooks did not argue that the defendant was a hearsay
declarant, although he clearly was. See id. Instead, it sought to distinguish James
because the defense testimony it sought to impeach "deal[t] with 'the very
statement of the defendant which had been suppressed."' Id. at *1.
159 See cases cited supra note 31.
160 See cases cited supra note 32.
161 Wilkes v. United States, 631 A.2d 880, 889 (D.C. 1993) ("We do not think the
truth-seeking function of a trial would be served, even marginally, if the medical
experts on either side of the case were required to render opinions on complicated
issues of mental disability while ignorant of facts essential to a valid diagnosis.").
162 Id. at 890 ("We do not think that such a defendant should be allowed to lie to
the psychiatrist and get away with it when there is evidence tending to show that he
lied and that the psychiatrist's diagnosis was based on that lie.").
163 Id. ("A defendant may still avoid admission of the suppressed evidence if he
or she does not open the door by telling something to a psychiatrist that is
contradicted by that evidence.").
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But no court stopped to consider what interpreting James to
allow all this evidence would mean for its attempt to preserve
some exclusion beyond the prosecution's case-in-chief. Lost in
the discussion was what James would exclude if it permitted
impeachment of all of the defendant's out of court statements
implicating his credibility. Rather than analysis, courts offered
only blithe assertions that impeachment of nontestifying
defendants would amount to an unusual circumstance and
narrow exception to James's prohibition. 64  Analysis and
subsequent experience, however, show otherwise.
As a rule, defense witnesses' exculpatory testimony will
incorporate defendant hearsay or otherwise implicate
defendants' veracity. Cases where defense witnesses' testimony
will not implicate defendants' credibility will constitute the
exceptions. Consequently, admissibility of illegally obtained
evidence to impeach nontestifying defendants will routinely
depend only upon the same manipulation of truth seeking as
governs when courts concede that a defendant's credibility is
implicated, as discussed in the previous part. But for narrowly
focusing on truth speaking, in ways not required by the Court's
ambiguous conception of truth seeking and foreign to evidence
law, instances of exclusion will be rare and unpredictable
exceptions rather than the rule. The effect of extending the
exception to nontestifying defendants is effectively to use
James's truth-seeking rationale to vitiate its deterrence
component.
The "hearsay" test for impeachment of defendants actually
eliminates very little exculpatory evidence. Virtually any
exculpatory evidence will involve proof of a defendant's words
and conduct since his behavior is the subject of the trial. Under
the FRE's definition of hearsay, the defendant's conduct,
whether verbal or not, is potentially hearsay if it is intended as an
assertion. 165  If verbal or nonverbal conduct is intended to
communicate a fact whose existence the proponent wants the
164 See cases cited supra notes 31-32.
165 See FED. R. EVID. 801(a) ("A 'statement' is (1) an oral or written assertion or
(2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.");
FED. R. EVID. 801(c) ('Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted.").
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jury to infer from the conduct, it is hearsay and therefore subject
to impeachment.
Consider the facts in Trujillo. Any conduct exhibited by the
defendant asserting his belief that he was not due in the relevant
court on the relevant day would be as much hearsay as his saying
that he was unaware of the appointment. To show his belief that
there was no such appointment, the defendant relied on his
wife's testimony that he had not reported that appointment to
her.' 66 A court would thus have to decide whether, in the
circumstances, his nonreport was intended to communicate that
he had no appointment. Although courts would typically
presume a nonreport alone to be nonassertive, they would also
clearly find failure to make a report in response to an inquiry to
be assertive and hence hearsay. 167 Trujillo's wife did not testify
that his nonreport came in response to a specific request that she
made to Trujillo to report any scheduled appearances, but she
did testify to an established practice that reluired Trujillo to
report and she to record his court dates. The practice
amounted to a standing instruction to report all court dates
without which the nonreport was simply not probative of
Trujillo's belief that he had no appointment, making a strong
case for Trujillo's understanding his nonreport to communicate
that belief to his wife. Coupled with the suppressed evidence
that he was aware of the appointment he failed to report to his
wife, circumstances easily qualify Trujillo's silence as an
intended assertion of his belief that he had no subsequent court
date, justifying introduction of his illegally obtained admission. 6 9
In addition, further analysis of the facts shows that the
evidence suggesting that Trujillo was unaware of the
appointment consisted of more than his mere nonreport.
Trujillo's wife not only testified that he had not told her of the
relevant date; she also stated that he told her of an appointment
in a different court on the same day.7 ° In a context in which he
166 People v. Trujillo, 49 P.3d 316, 318 (Colo. 2002).
167 See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 76, § 8.10.
168 Trujillo, 49 P.3d at 318.
169 A host of additional factors such as the regularity and importance of the
practice and whether there had been recent reminders or discussion of it could
affect the court's decision about whether his failing to tell her about the
appointment was intended to assert its nonexistence.
170 Trujillo, 49 P.3d at 318.
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reported another court date, his failure to report the omitted
date was that much more likely intended to assert its
nonexistence. But it was hardly necessary to focus on the
nonreport. Trujillo's report of the other appointment was clearly
hearsay to show that he believed that he had a different
appointment that he mistakenly confused with the relevant one,
inviting impeachment with his statement showing knowledge of
the latter engagement.
Moreover, even if Trujillo had merely said nothing and one
was uncertain whether his nonreport was intended as an
assertion, it can still qualify as hearsay subjecting him to
impeachment. The assertion-based definition of hearsay
adopted by FRE 801(a) is not adopted everywhere. Some
jurisdictions continue to use the common law's "declarant-
centered" definition of hearsay which does not require that the
declarant's conduct be intended to assert the fact it is offered to
171prove. It is enough if the conduct's relevance depends upon
172the declarant's belief in the matter it is being offered to prove.
The idea is very simple.
The "assertion-based" definition of hearsay excludes from its
ambit nonassertive conduct and assertive conduct offered for
reasons other than its asserted inference on the theory that, if
offered to prove a fact that the declarant was not intending to
assert, the risk of insincerity is substantially reduced. 73 But, as
proponents of the "declarant-centered" definition are quick to
point out, the risk of insincerity, even if reduced for conduct that
174appears nonassertive, is hardly eliminated. Conduct that
appears nonassertive on its face may nonetheless have been
intended as an assertion by the declarant. Consequently, the
inexact application of the "intent to assert" test will undoubtedly
allow some intended assertions with a high risk of insincerity.1
75
171 See RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, AND CASES
451 (4th ed. 2006).
172 See id.; see, e.g., TEX. R. EVID. 801(c).
173 See FED. R. EVID. 801(a) Advisory Committee's Note.
174 See, e.g., ALLEN ET AL., supra note 171, at 445-47 (noting the impossibility of
eliminating the sincerity risk because intent to assert test must include the
declarant's unstated beliefs).
175 Id. at 436 (describing that the intent to assert test "inevitably entails the risk
that the wrong decision will be made.., because the actor has cleverly disguised an
assertion").
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Furthermore, as proponents of the common law test are also
quick to point out, the assertion-based definition of hearsay
concentrates only on the reduced sincerity risk, ignoring the
narration, memory, and perception risks affecting nonassertive
conduct as well as intended assertions. 176 Under the declarant-
centered definition of hearsay, Trujillo's nonreport of his
appointment is hearsay regardless of whether he intended to
communicate anything to his wife by not reporting it. It is
enough that the relevance of the nonreport to prove that he did
not know of the court date clearly depends upon his belief that
he had no such appointment.
For whatever reason, the prosecution in Trujillo did not argue
that the illegally obtained evidence was admissible to impeach
Trujillo because he was a hearsay declarant. Instead, they made
another argument that the court rejected because it conceded
that Trujillo's wife was the sole object of the State's
, 177
impeachment efforts. But that concession was surely
unnecessary. Had the court focused on Trujillo's impeachment
as a hearsay declarant, perhaps it would have realized how far
allowing impeachment of defendants' hearsay declarations
would go toward undermining James. Even Trujillo's mere
silence would surely be hearsay under a declarant-centered
definition and possibly be hearsay under an assertion-centered
definition.
Meanwhile, although the hearsay characterization of Trujillo's
silence under the assertion-centered view might be problematic,
it still presented no obstacle to his impeachment. First, the
broader, declarant-centered definition would encompass
occasions on which nontestifying defendants' conduct implicated
their credibility. The assertion-based definition cannot capture
all instances in which a defendant engages in conduct with intent
to mislead and overlooks the other hearsay risks besides
176 Id. at 435 (observing that the advisory committee inexplicably and without
support asserts that the hearsay dangers associated with the testimonial capacities
of perception, memory, and narration are "'minimal in the absence of an intent to
assert"' (quoting FED. R. EvID. 801(a) Advisory Committee's Note)); see Laurence
H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 972-73 (1974). Tribe
argues that the hearsay dangers associated with nonassertive conduct counsel, at
most, creating a hearsay exception admitting it. See id. If such conduct were
admitted pursuant to a hearsay exception, it could be impeached pursuant to FRE
806.
177 See People v. Trujillo, 49 P.3d 316, 318 (Colo. 2002).
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sincerity. Therefore, neither truth speaking nor truth finding
supports applying the narrower hearsay definition, even if
adopted by local hearsay law.
7 8
Second, admissibility of illegal contradicting proof as a matter
of local evidence law does not depend upon designation of the
defendant's out-of-court statement as hearsay under those rules.
Illegal contradicting proof is admissible rebuttal evidence
regardless of whether it impeaches the defendant's credibility.
The admissibility of Trujillo's confession to contradict evidence
of his conduct showing him unaware of the court date, for
example, did not depend upon that conduct's classification as
hearsay. The statement rebutted the inference of Trujillo's
ignorance, whether or not local hearsay law conceived his
conduct showing that ignorance as hearsay. Since it was
admissible under local evidence law regardless of whether the
jurisdiction used an assertion-based definition, there was nothing
to stop its admission subject to the usual instruction that it be
used only to impeach Trujillo and not as affirmative proof of
guilt.
Indeed, only admission would insure that suppression had not
enabled the defendant to "lie and get away with it,' ' 179 as
repeatedly evidenced by cases allowing evidence contradicting
defendants' statements to experts. In these cases, courts allow
prosecutors to use illegally obtained evidence to contradict
defendants' out of court statements irrespective of whether they
are admitted as hearsay at all and regardless of the hearsay
178 Reasons besides reliability may support the narrower definition. See ALLEN
ET AL., supra note 171, at 435-36 (explaining that a variety of necessity arguments
may support the narrower view). But even if adopting the narrower definition
illustrates a jurisdiction's belief that the evidence it exempts from hearsay
characterization is reliable enough to be admitted, that belief cannot support
imposing the narrower definition under the impeachment exception. The
jurisdiction premises the belief that admitting such evidence promotes truth seeking
on the assumption that, where it does not, contradictory evidence will rebut it.
Truth seeking cannot support adopting the narrower definition where the
consequence is to disable the prosecution from rebutting false evidence whose
admission the definition allows.
179 See Wilkes v. United States, 631 A.2d 880, 890 (D.C. 1993) ("We do not think
that such a defendant should be allowed to lie to the psychiatrist and get away with
it when there is evidence tending to show that he lied and that the psychiatrist's
diagnosis was based on that lie.").
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definition employed.' 80 Courts deciding those cases agree that
the hearsay classification is not determinative of nontestifying
defendants' impeachment. Instead, that the probity of the
defense witness's testimony is dependent upon the credibility of
180 See cases cited supra note 32. In those cases, the statements may have been
admitted under FRE 803(4) (the hearsay exception for statements made for
purposes of medical diagnosis), entitling the jury to consider them for their truth.
See FED. R. EvID. 803(4). They also may have been admitted under FRE 703
(allowing experts to base inferences and opinions on inadmissible evidence) subject
to a limiting instruction requiring the jury to use them only to assess the basis of the
expert's opinion. See FED. R. EvID. 703. In the latter case, the defendant is not a
hearsay declarant. But the courts did not rely on that distinction to determine
admissibly, properly recognizing that the circumstances making the defendant a
hearsay declarant do not exhaust the situations in which his credibility is an issue
justifying impeachment. The defendant's credibility is equally important whether
the jury relies upon his statement for its truth or credits an expert's conclusion
because it is informed by the defendant's statement. To do the latter requires the
jury to find that the expert is not just informed, but informed accurately by the
defendant's statement. Effectively, then, the jury need not directly rely on the truth
of the defendant's statement to make his credibility an issue; it relies indirectly on
his credibility when the expert offers an opinion presupposing the truth of the
defendant's statement.
The illegally obtained evidence contradicting the defendant's statement
undermines reliance on its truth whether the jury's reliance is direct (e.g., he
committed the crime during a blackout because he said he did) or indirect (e.g., he
committed the crime during a blackout because the expert said he did, a conclusion
he partially supported by crediting the defendant's statement that he committed the
crime during a blackout). Courts have disagreed about whether contradicting the
defendant's statement to his psychiatrist impeaches the defense expert as well as the
defendant. Nonetheless, only the appropriate limiting instruction is at stake; courts
have unanimously agreed that the evidence is admissible to impeach nontestifying
defendants' statements to their experts regardless of whether they are admitted as
hearsay. Compare Wilkes, 631 A.2d at 884, 890-91 (defendant's illegal statements
showing memory of crime admissible to impeach defense psychiatrist's testimony
that defendant suffered a blackout; statements subject to limiting instruction telling
jury to use the proof only when considering defendant's insanity defense and not
when deciding whether the government proved the elements of the crime), with
State v. DeGraw, 470 S.E.2d 215, 222 (W. Va. 1996) (defendant's illegally obtained
statements showing memory of crime admissible to impeach defendant's claim to
have suffered a blackout; statements subject to limiting instruction preventing the
jury from considering them to establish the truth of statements so as not "to
impeach a defense witness's testimony, but to impeach the contradictory statements
the defendant made to that witness"). The DeGraw court's attempt to confine the
effect of the proof to the defendant's impeachment fails for two reasons. First, it
treats the defendant's illegal statements as if they were only inconsistent statements
inadmissible for their truth, thereby confusing their (prohibited) affirmative and
(permissible) substantive uses. Second, jurors can hardly be expected to follow a
limiting instruction telling them to use the statements (considered as substantive
evidence) to rebut the testimony of the defendant but not other witnesses when, as
is frequently the case, their testimony is offered to establish the same point.
181 See cases cited supra note 32.
20071
OREGON LAW REVIEW
a defendant's (possibly fabricated or otherwise false) statements
determines admission. The circumstances under which this is
true are simply not limited to occasions in which the defendant's
statements are admitted as hearsay, much less whether they are
admitted as hearsay under any particular definition.
Even if courts were to use only the "hearsay-declarant" test to
limit impeachment of nontestifying defendants, the test
immediately stumbles upon the distinction between defendants'
"statements" implicating their credibility, and conduct, which
does not. Both hearsay definitions encompass as "statements"
any conduct, including nonverbal conduct, which a defendant
may have engaged in with an eye toward misleading observers
about his responsibility for the criminal conduct. In the present
context, when a court decides whether the defendant's conduct
was so intended, it does so with the benefit of illegally obtained
evidence contradicting the exculpatory inference the defendant is
drawing from his conduct. Under that circumstance, it is a
foregone conclusion that the defendant may have engaged in the
conduct to disguise his involvement in the crime. The
consequences are manifest. All that can potentially prevent
admission of the illegally obtained evidence is an ad hoc
judgment about whether, despite questioning the defendant's
credibility, the contradicting proof mostly shows him to be
insincere or the innocent bearer of false or misleading evidence.
This is a judgment whose relation to truth telling, much less truth
finding, is tenuous at best.
The problem is endemic because little or no exculpatory
conduct of defendants will be immune from impeachment
because it is free from the possibility that the defendant engaged
in that conduct to cover up his crime. One might think such a
circumstance exists when a defense witness offers the defendant
182
an alibi contradicted by illegally obtained evidence. But even
then, one would have to examine the circumstances of the alibi
testimony carefully to see whether it did not encompass
exculpatory evidence manufactured by the defendant.
182 See, e.g., State v. Green, 500 S.E.2d 452, 464 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (Horton, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that illegally obtained statements were improperly used to
impeach alibi witnesses, but not considering whether nature of the reported alibi
rendered defendant a hearsay declarant); see also Jackson v. United States, 589
A.2d 1270, 1271 (D.C. 1991); cf. People v. Hernandez, No. B170634, 2004 WL
2428700, at *12-13 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2004).
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The facts of James are particularly telling. In James, the
defendant offered the testimony of a witness describing James's
appearance at the time of the crime as different from that of the
shooter described by seven eyewitnesses to the murder.
83
Illegally obtained evidence showed that James had dramatically
changed his hairstyle the morning after the shooting from that
matching the eyewitnesses' description.' 4  Under the
circumstances, it was silly to imagine that James had suddenly
been seized with the need to make a fashion statement and his
makeover was unrelated to a desire to disguise the possibility
that he was the gunman. If so motivated, changing his
appearance implicated his credibility no less than an equally
exculpatory description of his appearance at the time of the
crime. Once allowing impeachment of nontestifying defendants'
hearsay declarations, disallowing James's impeachment made as
much sense as impeaching defendants' exculpatory claims made
to their psychiatrists, but forbidding impeachment of their
malingering conduct in the psychiatrists' presence designed to
support those claims.
Even testimony about defendants' mere physical presence at a
certain location can trigger hearsay categorization and clearly
implicate defendants' credibility. Consider Appling v. State, in
which the defendant was charged with possession of stolen
property. 8- The defendant offered his girlfriend's testimony that
a friend, Haas, had borrowed defendant's truck and returned
"with the bed of the truck full of liquor cases. 18 6 When he saw
the liquor, defendant asked Haas, "'What is this?' Haas replied
that his girlfriend, whose parents owned several liquor stores,
gave it to him. 18 7 The defendant argued that Haas's statement
was nonhearsay proof admissible for its effect on him to show
183 James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 310 (1990).
184 See id. at 309. James was arrested after the crime at his mother's hair salon,
where he appeared with short, black hair. Id. Witnesses to the crime testified that
he wore long reddish-hair while committing the crime. Id. at 310. Although
James's witness testified that James wore short, black hair on the night of the crime,
James admitted, in his illegally obtained postarrest statement, to having worn long,
reddish hair on the night of the crime and to having gone to his mother's beauty
shop afterwards to change his appearance. See id. at 309-10.
185 Appling v. State, 904 S.W.2d 912, 914-15 (Tex. App. 1995).
186 Id. at 916.
187 Id.
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that he was unaware that the liquor was stolen property. 18 But
the court allowed Appling's impeachment, finding that his
question, "What is this?" was a hearsay statement effectively
denying knowledge of the liquor's origins.189 To impeach his
denial, it admitted suppressed statements in which Appling had
variously claimed (1) that the liquor was his, obtained for a party
he was giving, although he had no receipt for it, and (2) that
although the liquor did not belong to him, he took it when he
found it abandoned in the grass on the side of the road while
stopping to urinate.'9°
Although the court relied on Appling's question to trigger his
impeachment, Haas's answer, admitted as nonhearsay proof for
its effect on Appling, was equally deserving of hearsay
classification, implicating Appling's credibility. A doctrine that
allowed Appling's impeachment only because he inquired,
"What is this?" but otherwise ignored his role in eliciting and
adopting Haas' false exculpatory statement would be absurd. ' 9'
Appling's witness need not have volunteered that Appling
inquired about the liquor; it was enough for her to testify that
Haas, in Appling's presence, explained how he obtained it.
Denying Appling's impeachment because Haas's statement was
offered only for its effect on Appling, however, would overlook
that Haas was an accomplice who, with Appling's cooperation,
likely staged the exculpatory statement in the presence of
Appling's girlfriend so she would not object to their having the
liquor at her house. Even if he were not part of the charade
from the beginning, and only played along with Haas by failing
to dispute Haas's account of the liquor's origins, Appling's
credibility was no less implicated when he cooperated in the
deception by adopting Haas's explanation than it was by his
seemingly innocent question.
The hearsay-declarant test for impeaching nontestifying
defendants fared no better at establishing a categorical boundary
when defendants' assertive verbal statements were purportedly
188 See id.
189 See id. at 916-17.
190 Id. at 915-16.
191 Moreover, some courts might not find that question hearsay at all. See
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 76, § 8.4, at 702 & n.5 (noting cases holding
that questions are nonassertive and arguing that questions should be interpreted as
hearsay).
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admitted as legally operative "verbal acts" rather than for their
truth. Admission of defendants' statements in those
circumstances would not trigger impeachment under FRE 806
because their relevance does not depend upon the truth of any
matter being asserted by the defendant. Since the relevance of
"verbal acts" depends solely on whether they are uttered, they
implicate only the reporting witness's, and not the defendant's,
credibility. Trzaska, however, illustrates well how the line
between verbal act and hearsay declaration is easily obliterated
when the issue concerns the relevance of a nontestifying
defendant's statement to his culpability.
Recall that the Trzaska II court assumed that Trzaska was a
hearsay declarant who could possibly be impeached with illegally
obtained evidence because, inter alia, it sought to avoid deciding
whether his statement, offered without qualification and
admitted without objection, should be considered for all
(including hearsay) purposes for which it was relevant or only
for the (nonhearsay) purpose for which the proponent
intended. Avoiding that question presupposed that if
Trzaska's statement had been offered only as a verbal act, he
could not be impeached. Hoping to avoid admission of the
illegally obtained evidence, defense counsel argued that he
intended the statement only as a verbal act by which Trzaska
transferred title of the guns to his son and that he used the
statement consistently with its admission only as a verbal act.
1 93
In summation, defense counsel noted that Trzaska's instructions
to his son to pick up the guns from Trzaska's friend were given
while Trzaska said that he was through with guns and did not
want them anymore.194 Uttering the instructions coupled with
the disclaimer of interest, he contended, sufficed to transfer title
to the guns to Trzaska's son irrespective of the truth of Trzaska's
asserted disinterest in them.9  But analysis of the statement's
bearing on Trzaska's culpability shows the futility of attempting
to separate hearsay from nonhearsay inferences to allow
impeachment only if the statement's relevance implicates his
credibility.
192 See United States v. Trzaska (Trzaska II), 111 F.3d 1019, 1026 (2d Cir. 1997).
193 See id.
194 United States v. Trzaska (Trzaska 1), 885 F. Supp. 46, 47 (E.D.N.Y. 1995),
rev'd, 111 F.3d 1019 (2d Cir. 1997).
195 Trzaska 1I, 111 F.3d at 1026.
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To begin with, the proposition that Trzaska's words
constituted only a verbal act transferring title to the guns was
problematic at best. For that to be true, Trzaska's mere uttering
of the words would have to establish the donative intent and
delivery required to make a completed gift.196 The statement,
"they're yours" (to which defense counsel argued Trzaska's
words amounted), while pointing to an object not easily capable
of manual transfer, has been held a nonhearsay verbal act that
transfers title.'97 Here, since the guns were in another's custody,
courts may not require Trzaska physically to hand them over to
make a completed gift, and might hold instead that the
instructions to pick them up would satisfy the delivery
requirement. 9 8 Alternatively, one commentator has termed the
delivery requirement "a fiction that is roughly equivalent to
intent and may be viewed as one way of proving that the donor
wanted to transfer ownership of his property." 19 9  In effect,
"courts will sustain a gift of chattels on some theory, so long as
they are convinced that the parties intended that result and gave
some objective manifestation of that intent. ' '200 The instruction
to retrieve the guns in which Trzaska disclaimed an interest may
satisfy this relaxed view of the delivery requirement by
"objectively manifesting" Trzaska's intent to part with the guns.
Viewing Trzaska's statement as satisfying the delivery
requirement, however, does not mean that it functions only as a
verbal act. However one conceives the delivery requirement,
196 The gift of a chattel requires donative intent, delivery, and acceptance.
WALTER B. RAUSHENBUSH, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 7.1, at 77-78
(3d ed. 1975). Acceptance is presumed where the gift is beneficial to the donee. Id.
§ 7.14, at 127-28. Here, the guns benefited Kevin financially and by potentially
eliminating his father's liability for their possession, and there was no suggestion
that Kevin expressly refused them. Therefore, whether there was a completed gift
would depend upon satisfying the intent and delivery requirements.
197 See, e.g., Hanson v. Johnson, 201 N.W. 322, 322-23 (Minn. 1924) (holding that
tenant's pointing to a double crib of corn while saying to his landlord "this belongs
to you" was a verbal act transferring title to the corn from the tenant to the
landlord).
198 RAUSHENBUSH, supra note 196, § 7.4, at 87 (noting that physical delivery is
not required where goods are in the custody of a third person); id. § 7.5, at 92-93
(stating that constructive delivery, the surrendering of power and control to a donee
by means other than physical delivery, satisfies the delivery requirement where
actual delivery is inconvenient).
199 JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
PROPERTY 153 (3d ed. 1989).
200 Id. at 154-55 (footnote omitted).
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whether Trzaska actually had the requisite donative intent is still
relevant to the transfer of title. Even if conceived as an
objective manifestation of his intent, his spoken words are also
evidence of his subjective state of mind, which helps determine
201whether a gift has been made. Indeed, since the words were
necessary to show his subjective intent to part with the guns,
evidence tending to show that Trzaska did not actually intend to
transfer them should be admissible. As evidence of his
subjective intent to part with title, the claimed desire to be
through with the guns is hearsay impeachable by any evidence
showing that he actually harbored a contrary intent, such as his
201 To this extent, the law of gifts differs from the law of contracts where the
objective manifestation of intent often controls over the subjective intent of the
parties. In contract:
Intent to contract is determined objectively; the manifestation of a party's
intention rather than his actual, real or secret intent is controlling .... In
many cases ... it will be sufficient to charge that if a party said specified
words or did a particular act he is bound, without discussion of intent.
When that is not possible, the jury should be instructed that ... [a] person's
secret intent has no bearing; only the intent indicated by his words and acts
may be considered.
2 COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, ASS'N OF SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES, NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 4:1, at 870 (1968)
(internal citations omitted). In the law of gifts: "A valid gift requires a showing of
intent by the gift-giver to make a gift .... Intent to make a gift means a present
desire on the part of the owner of property to transfer ownership to another." 2
COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, ASS'N OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES,
NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 7:65, at 1356 (2d ed. 2008)
(emphasis added). An earlier version of this instruction required a putative donor
to "manifest" an intention to make a gift, but nonetheless also described the
requisite intention as a matter of the donor's "present desire." 2 COMM. ON
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, ASS'N OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, NEW YORK
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCrIONS-CIVIL § 7:65, at 1225 (1968). The current
instruction, which substitutes a "showing" for a "manifestation" of the putative
donor's donative intent, makes clear that the earlier requirement was intended to
be an evidentiary, not a substantive, requirement for a gift since "the law does not
assume that a gift was made or intended." 2 COMM. ON PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, ASS'N OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, NEW YORK PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 7:65, at 1356 (2d ed. 2008). Thus, the person claiming to
be the object of a gift must prove that the putative donor subjectively intended to
make a gift, usually, but not necessarily, by evidence that objectively manifested
donative intent.
The objectivist view of contract law protects the reasonable expectations of a
contractual partner over the unknown idiosyncrasies of the other contracting
partner. See, e.g., id. § 4:1, at 651-52 (noting that objectivist interpretation of
business contracts protects "the reasonable expectation and purpose of the ordinary
business person"). Donees, however, are the objects of gratuitous transfers, and
thus do not receive equivalent protection from the idiosyncrasies of donors.
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continuing possession of and obsession with guns. Furthermore,
given the obvious overlap between viewing the words as an
objective manifestation of intent and as evidence of actual
intent, it is impossible to imagine the fact finder considering only
whether he said them to satisfy the delivery requirement, and
not whether he meant them to satisfy the donative intent
requirement.
More critically, treating the statement as a verbal act would be
wrong even if other proof of Trzaska's subjective attitude
rendered the statement unnecessary for that purpose.
Prohibiting the prosecution's evidence because a limiting
instruction would prevent the jury from considering the
statement's hearsay aspect (bearing on intent) while relying on
its nonhearsay aspect (bearing on delivery) would be
disingenuous because possession, not ownership, was its critical
concern. The issue for the jury was not whether Trzaska made
an enforceable gift of the guns, but rather whether he possessed
them when found in his garage. Whether Trzaska had legal title
to the guns, although "relevant to prove possession," was only a
subsidiary question while possession was the ultimate issue. 2
Possession requires "the power and intention to exercise
control over the firearm., 20 3  Despite whether Trzaska
transferred title to his son by virtue of his earlier statement, he
was guilty of the crime if he intended to exercise control over the
guns when police found them in his garage. Indeed, transfer of
ownership one year before the charged crime was relevant if,
and only if, one inferred Trzaska's intention regarding the guns
at the time of the crime from the fact that he had previously
given them away. Even assuming that he had conveyed title, the
jury, to evaluate that inference, would have to ask about the
depth of his desire and commitment to be through with the guns,
and whether he changed his mind about them. After all, the
very point of Trzaska's transferring ownership may have been to
facilitate their continued possession by inducing his son to
retrieve and store them, allowing Trzaska easier access and
providing him with a cover story.
Additionally, a shallow, momentary desire to surrender title
to the guns, however effective for that purpose, hardly bespoke
202 See 2 SAND ET AL., supra note 94, § 35.07 (Instructions 35-49).
203 Id.
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continuing disinterest once they were again within his reach. So
it was not possible to imagine that the jury could evaluate the
significance of Trzaska's statements on the issue of possession
without considering them as evidence of how he really thought
about them-his subjective desire to be done with them-
regardless of whatever legal effect merely uttering the words
may have had. Treating Trzaska as a hearsay declarant, despite
counsel's self-imposed limits on use of his proof, was entirely
appropriate, since what his words asserted about his state of
mind regarding the guns was far more important than the legal
effect they had on passage of title. Trzaska could have been in
possession of the guns even if title had passed to his son, and not
in possession even if title remained in him. So it made no sense
to think that the words could be used only as a verbal act and
treated merely as proof of what Trzaska did with the guns, but
not what he really thought about them.
The inability of the hearsay-declarant test to provide a
meaningful boundary to the impeachment of nontestifying
defendants with illegally obtained evidence is a consequence of
applying it in a context for which it is neither designed nor
suited. Evidence suppressed by the exclusionary rule on the
prosecution's case-in-chief consists of proof that is substantive
rebuttal, routinely admissible regardless of whether it also
impeaches a witness's credibility. The illegally obtained
evidence in Trzaska, for example, was admissible to rebut any
inferences of nonpossession from Trzaska's proof regardless of
whether he was a hearsay declarant. In contrast, evidence for
which admission depends upon FRE 806's permission to
impeach hearsay declarants bears no inference on a
substantively relevant matter; if it did bear a substantively
relevant inference, it would be admissible for that reason
without reference to whether it impeached anyone, much less
whether that person was a hearsay declarant or a testifying
witness.
With credibility-only evidence, however, the impeachment
204
exception is rarely, if ever concerned . Indeed, in the rareinstance where it was, the Court held that illegally obtained
204 Such evidence includes general credibility evidence such as proof of bias,
incapacity, criminal conviction, or act of truthfulness. General credibility evidence
suggests why the witness should be doubted, but proves no fact showing the
unreliability of any specific portion of the witness's statement.
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general credibility proof was not probative enough to justify
admission under the exception. But even without that
decision, it is apparent that virtually all suppressed evidence
potentially admissible under the impeachment exception is the
product of an unlawful search or interrogation and, but for being
illegally obtained, is admissible substantive evidence of guilt.
Consequently, applying the hearsay-declarant test to defense
evidence entails excluding suppressed proof that rebuts
exculpatory evidence of defendants' behavior. To do so, courts
must draw a distinction for which there is no occasion in
evidence law between contradicting the evidence and impeaching
the person whose words or conduct constitutes the evidence.
When FRE 806 asks whether a person is a hearsay declarant for
purposes of impeachment, the inquiry asks whether evidence
bearing only on that person's credibility and not on substantive
issues-i.e., general credibility proof-merits admission.
Meanwhile, any substantive evidence rebutting inferences
from defense proof is admissible without regard to whether it
also potentially shows statements by a witness or hearsay
declarant to be false. There is simply no occasion for asking how
the evidence may show the statement false as opposed to
otherwise rebutting the very inferences making it relevant.
There is no precedent in evidence law for deciding whether a
person is a hearsay declarant when admission of substantively
relevant evidence contradicting inferences from that person's
conduct hangs in the balance. The hearsay-declarant test for
credibility-only proof is hardly designed or suited for this
context, much less when the person is a criminal defendant
asking the fact finder to draw exculpatory inferences from his
own conduct. Courts must assess the defendant's intention to
assert the exculpatory inferences shown false by the suppressed
proof against the backdrop of his being the beneficiary of the
inferences. As analysis of the cases suggests, the combination of
proof contradicting the evidence and the defendant's obvious
205 See, e.g., Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 482 n.l (1972) (distinguishing illegally
obtained evidence "rebutting a specific false statement" from evidence "blackening
[the witness's] character and thus damaging his general credibility in the eyes of the
jury" and holding that only the former should be permitted under the impeachment
exception); see also Mary Jo White, Comment, The Impeachment Exception to the
Constitutional Exclusionary Rules, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1476, 1479-80, 1496 (1973)
("[T]he Supreme Court [has] made it quite clear that specific credibility decisions
such as Walder and Harris are irrelevant to general credibility problems.").
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interest assures that circumstances sufficient to demonstrate that
he is a hearsay declarant are routinely present.
Rather than provide a categorical boundary to the use of
illegally obtained evidence, the hearsay-declarant test in this
context replicates the uncertainty engendered by the ambiguity
between truth telling and truth finding. It entails similar ad hoc
judgments about the extent to which the defendant's credibility is
implicated by contradicted, exculpatory proof of his conduct.
The test also rests on the same distinction between the veracity
of the evidence and the inferences that it supports, which is
unknown to evidence law and unable to segregate credibility
inferences from substantive rebuttal. Trying to parse these
overlapping inferences is no more tenable a means of isolating
hearsay statements than it is a way of assuring truth seeking.
When the court in Havens allowed impeachment of testimony
elicited in cross-examination reasonably suggested by the direct,
it acknowledged that even the narrower goal of truth telling
could not be squared with restricting impeachment to matters
literally asserted on direct examination without considering how
they were intended to be understood, and would be understood,
by a reasonable fact finder. As the analysis has shown, the
exculpatory conduct of a criminal defendant will always have a
potential hearsay aspect, and to ignore that aspect by
immunizing the conduct from contradicting evidence similarly
fails to promote truth telling as much as it fails to promote truth
finding. Indeed, to ignore it is simply to put a premium on the
skill of the defendant, his counsel, or his witness in disguising the
hearsay aspects of the defendant's conduct.
For example, Appling's counsel may disguise Appling's
involvement in his accomplice's exculpatory statement by not
eliciting Appling's words, "What's this?," that the court found
justified admission of the illegally obtained evidence.2 0 By the
same token, Trzaska's counsel may disguise Trzaska's
involvement in distancing himself from the guns by eliciting from
Trzaska's son that the guns were his, not Trzaska's, also without
reporting any of Trzaska's words. Impeachment under the
hearsay-declarant test would then depend simply upon the
206 Alternatively, Appling himself may have staged his accomplice's statement in
his girlfriend's presence without uttering the fateful words, or Trzaska may have
waited until retrieving the guns and just handed them to his son.
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extent to which the court allowed the prosecution to probe on
cross-examination for the defendant's underlying words or
conduct that the illegally obtained evidence undoubtedly
impeaches. Nothing from an evidentiary perspective limits this
inquiry; there is no truth-seeking reason to prevent the jury from
learning of Appling's involvement in his own exculpation. Nor is
there any truth-seeking reason preventing the jury from learning
that the son based his claim of exclusive possession on Trzaska's
assertion a year earlier.
Under the impeachment exception, the only possible
limitation on the scope of the witness's cross-examination would
be the "reasonably suggested by the direct rule," applied now to
questions about the defendant's conduct reported by the witness.
But there is surely no limitation emerging from that rule either;
exploration of any exculpatory inference from the defendant's
conduct is fair game, including whether its probative force
depends upon defendant's credibility. Once the prosecution
elicits the details surrounding the defendant's conduct, the
propriety of his impeachment as a hearsay declarant is clear.
Undoubtedly, some courts will restrict efforts to elicit the
details of defendant's conduct implicated by the witness's
testimony, perhaps conceiving that they are preventing the
prosecution from "opening its own door" to admission of the
illegally obtained evidence. But doing so would interject
exclusionary-rule policy in a fashion that, while laudable, is in no
way required by any evidentiary test incorporated by the
impeachment exception, much less one related to truth seeking.
Assuming defendants' words or conduct that appear at first
blush not to be hearsay are, in fact, not hearsay, then preventing
further inquiry that will belie the assumption is justified, if at all,
by deterrence considerations, not accurate application of the
hearsay-declarant test.
Accurate application of the hearsay-declarant test inevitably
eviscerates James by routinely allowing illegally obtained
evidence. At best, therefore, the claim that the test limits, and
hence justifies, impeachment of nontestifying defendants with
illegally obtained evidence is based on a highly truncated,
distorted evidentiary inquiry into whether the defendant is a
hearsay declarant. Such an inquiry can be no more reliable a
means of predicting the admission of illegally obtained evidence
than trying to decide upon the extent to which illegally obtained
[Vol. 86, 1017
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evidence shows defense evidence, inferences from that evidence,
or the source of that evidence to be false. The answer is
undoubtedly that the evidence potentially shows them all false,
and the court's ultimate choice depends only on its willingness
selectively to ignore the various possibilities.
V
SIMULTANEOUSLY PURSUING TRUTH SEEKING AND
DETERRENCE DESTROYS BOTH
Whether courts distort evidentiary principles to restrict or
expand impeachment of nontestifying defendants, disguising
deterrence needs with ill-fitting evidentiary cloaks is more than a
harmless pretense. Its immediate consequence has been to
facilitate impeachment of nontestifying defendants and thereby
use what James said effectively to overrule what James did. The
truth-seeking argument for extending the exception is
impeccable, while the truth-seeking argument for restricting it is
demonstrably wrong, surviving only because of the confusion
engendered by the ambiguous truth-seeking notion that the
Court employs. The latter argument, of course, is equally wrong
when courts use it to deny that allowing impeachment of
nontestifying defendants effectively overrules James.
Nonetheless, courts restricting the exception's reach are required
to make erroneous truth-seeking claims while applying them to
the concrete facts of those cases. In contrast, courts extending
the exception's reach are required merely to refer to those
arguments as not permitting illegally obtained evidence in
imagined future scenarios devoid of concrete facts. Meanwhile,
the courts decide the cases before them by making unassailable
arguments about how impeachment serves truth seeking on the
actual facts of the case.
Wilkes illustrates how these contrasting uses of the Court's
infirm truth-seeking arguments inevitably tip the scale in favor
of extending the exception. The court decided that James admits
a defendant's illegal statements contradicting those made to his
psychiatrist.2 0 It began with an obviously correct truth-seeking
argument requiring mention only because of the way that the
impeachment exception cases have mangled the concept:
207 Wilkes v. United States, 631 A.2d 880, 881 (D.C. 1993).
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We do not think the truth-seeking function of a trial would be
served, even marginally, if the medical experts on either side of
the case were required to render opinions on complicated
issues of mental disability while ignorant of facts essential to a
valid diagnosis.2
Then, to square the result with James, the court blithely asserted
how Wilkes presented a unique situation because the threat of a
perjury prosecution (which James says assures truthful testimony
from defense witnesses but not defendants) would not prevent a
psychiatrist from innocently relating to the fact finder "untruths
told to him by his patient.''209 Required to address no concrete
scenario where the exception would not apply, the Wilkes court
failed to appreciate that the "perjury-no-deterrent" argument
hardly distinguished a psychiatrist from any other witness
reporting a defendant's hearsay statement. Moreover, if the
court imagined the psychiatrist unique because not deterred
from offering his own false opinion when relying on statements
not received as hearsay, the claim is equally, though perhaps less
obviously, false.
Wilkes held that truth seeking allowed the psychiatrist's
impeachment to expose his testimony's vulnerability to the
defendant's mendacity and, therefore, equally justified
impeachment of other defense witnesses whose testimony was
similarly vulnerable.21 °  Perhaps Wilkes had fooled his
psychiatrist into offering a false evaluation, but the same was
perhaps true of James fooling his alibi witness into offering a
false description of his appearance on the date of the crime,
Trzaska fooling his son into claiming exclusive possession of the
guns in his garage, Trujillo fooling his wife into testifying that he
demonstrated ignorance of an appointment which he
conveniently sought to avoid, and Appling fooling his girlfriend
into testifying that he was legitimately notified that the liquor
had been innocently obtained. From a truth-seeking
perspective, there is nothing different about the vulnerability of
the testimony of the expert and lay witnesses to the defendants'
mendacity.
The only evidentiary difference is the explicitness with which
an expert can base her testimony on information provided by
208 Id. at 889.
209 Id. at 889-90.
210 See id.
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others, 1  thereby implicating defendants' credibility without
necessarily triggering characterization of their statements as
hearsay. However, that difference does not support ignoring the
relationship between the veracity of the lay witnesses' testimony
and the defendant's credibility. Instead, it supports giving the
prosecution the latitude necessary to reveal the basis of the
witnesses' testimony in the defendant's credibility-implicating
behavior and thereby justifies the defendant's impeachment as a
hearsay declarant. That process is no different from allowing the
prosecution to show on cross-examination that a psychiatrist's
opinion depends on defendant's statements as prelude to
contradicting them although defense counsel strategically
212omitted mentioning the statements on direct . Truth seeking
does not tolerate defendants' obtaining the benefits of potential
deception whether it underlies the testimony of lay or expert
witnesses, a fact that would have been apparent had the Wilkes
court actually had to decide any of the other cases.
Besides permitting impeachment of nontestifying defendants,
following James's lead by misrepresenting deterrence claims as
promoting truth seeking renders application of that permission
entirely unpredictable. Comparing Judge Farrell's dissent in
Wilkes and the court's Trzaska II opinion illustrates the reason
why. Judge Farrell's dissent established him as the only judge
who would jettison James's manipulation of contradictory truth-
seeking arguments in favor of using deterrence categorically to
213prohibit impeachment of nontestifying defendants. The
approach has the virtue of establishing a per se rule excluding
illegally obtained evidence in a nontrivial number of easily
identifiable cases, but the putative vice of neglecting the Court's
truth-seeking rationale. The majority responded by disparaging
211 Experts, unlike lay witnesses, are exempt from the requirement that their
testimony be based on personal knowledge. See FED. R. EVID. 602.
212 See FED. R. EVID. 705 (stating that an expert is not required to reveal the
"underlying facts or data" upon which his opinion is based to offer that opinion).
213 Wilkes, 631 A.2d at 891 (Farrell, J., dissenting). This description merits
possible qualification because the majority allowed the evidence to impeach the
defense witness along with the defendant. See id. at 890-91 (majority opinion).
Consequently, it is theoretically possible that Judge Farrell objected only to the
former when he said that the permitted evidence was "classic impeachment of a
witness other than the defendant." Id. at 893 (Farrell, J., dissenting). But the
substance of his arguments supports excluding illegally obtained evidence if the
defendant does not testify regardless of whether it is used to impeach the defendant
or the defendant and his witness.
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a requirement that illegally obtained evidence impeach testifying
defendants as the product of a "wooden" interpretation of
214James. In contrast, a purposive reading allows courts further
to "fine-tune" the scope of the exception by selectively allowing
impeachment of nontestifying defendants in pursuit of the
optimal mix between truth seeking and deterrence.
Accepting the challenge, the Trzaska H court tried to show
how James's truth-seeking reasoning could prohibit
impeachment of a defendant's hearsay declaration2
Nevertheless, it succeeded only in showing how shifting focus
from deterrence to truth-seeking dissolved all predictability by
yielding the disparate and irreproducible results one would
216
expect from a fatally flawed and ambiguous analysis. Trzaska
II establishes no proposition broader than its facts, while the
same is true of Wilkes if one takes seriously its claim nonetheless
to prevent impeachment of most nontestifying defendants.
The only certainties to emerge from the morass are that,
although the defendant merits evidentiary impeachment in all
cases, the outcome will depend upon some combination of the
prosecution's sensitivity to the possibility of impeaching a
nontestifying defendant, its skill in showing how the defendant's
exculpatory words or conduct implicate his credibility, the
court's willingness to allow the prosecution to develop any
additional facts necessary to support that argument, and,
ultimately, the court's manipulation of the ambiguous
conception of truth-seeking enshrined in the doctrine.
The unpredictability of the outcomes undercuts both truth-
seeking and deterrence benefits that the Court used to justify
James. First, the evidentiary distortions that this Article shows
are necessary putatively to render exclusion an ally of the truth
cannot overcome the simple fact that, even if confined to truth
telling, the truth will always support impeaching nontestifying
defendants' exculpatory conduct. Second, since James teaches
214 See id. at 887 (majority opinion).
215 See United States v. Trzaska (Trzaska I1), 111 F.3d 1019, 1024-25 (2d Cir.
1997).
216 For example, all in the name of truth seeking, Trzaska cannot be impeached
despite fitting within FRE 806, Wilkes can be impeached despite not fitting within
FRE 806, Appling can be impeached for the words he put in his witness's mouth,
but potentially not for using his co-defendant to put equivalent words in the mouth
of his witness.
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that deterrence can be costless to the truth, courts are far more
likely to respond to evident truth-seeking costs by admitting
illegally obtained evidence than by making the hard choice that
217James portrayed as unnecessary to preserve deterrence 7. Third,
however nobly conceived in a sub rosa attempt to salvage James,
occasional cases such as Trzaska II, which attempt to shore up
deterrence by manipulating truth seeking, establish no principle.
One can hardly expect competent defense counsel to rely on its
holding and ignore its vivid illustration of the unpredictability of
exclusion when she decides whether to offer defense evidence
that may invite outcome determinative rebuttal.2 8
Absent the likelihood that defendants will risk admission of
illegally obtained evidence by offering exculpatory proof, and
without a discernible principle identifying occasions for
217 It can hardly be an accident that seventeen years after James, Trzaska II
stands alone in prohibiting impeachment of a nontestifying defendant despite an
express claim that his evidence implicated his credibility.
218 Commentators cannot agree on an explanation for Trzaska I's result, much
less suggest circumstances under which a court would replicate it. For example,
David Farnham, after observing that even a direct contradiction requirement
cannot explain Trzaska II, writes:
It seems that the court was looking for a way to remedy the severe
prejudice to Trzaska . . . from ... the other rifle and large quantities of
ammunition-without having to establish an exception under Rule 806 to
the principle established by the Supreme Court that a defendant's
testimony may be impeached with illegal evidence.
David Farnham, Impeaching the Hearsay Declarant: Rule 806 Can Be a Trap for the
Unwary Lawyer, CRIM. JUST., Winter 1998, at 4, 9. Where Farnham saw the court
motivated to preserve prosecutors' ability to impeach defendants' hearsay
declarations, Professor Michael Martin saw it motivated to restrict prosecutors'
power in cases with "constitutional overtones." Michael Martin, Impeachment of
Hearsay Evidence, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 8, 1997, at 3. Meanwhile, Professor Michael
Graham observed:
Having stated and embraced a liberal test for inconsistency, the court in
Trzaska went on to conclude that the statement offered to impeach was not
"inconsistent" and reversed on that basis alone, illustrating once again that
a case crying out for reversal will sometimes be heard and that the
application of accepted doctrine in such cases should be recognized for
what it is-a hook upon which fairness rests.
2 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 613.2, at 855 n.3
(6th ed. 2006). Professor Graham does not say why Trzaska cried out for reversal
or why fairness would militate in favor of exclusion. Trzaska H offers defense
lawyers needing to know whether witnesses' anticipated testimony will open the
door to illegally obtained evidence scant comfort, especially when they consider
that most other cases say fairness supports admitting any evidence that promotes
truth seeking and potentially prevents perjury.
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excluding evidence despite its probity, occasional exclusion of
evidence impeaching nontestifying defendants cannot deter
police from obtaining evidence illegally. Meanwhile, isolated
courts may occasionally strike blows on behalf of deterrence. In
addition, exclusion will continue to occur in the more frequent
cases where defense counsel stumbles into taking the risk, and
the prosecution either overlooks the possibility of impeaching
the nontestifying defendant or advances the wrong argument for
doing so.
These cases impose undeniable truth-seeking costs, but not in
a fashion that one can expect to accomplish any offsetting
deterrence benefits. An investigator conducting a cost/benefit
analysis before taking an illegal step that may yield probative
evidence is unlikely to refrain from taking that step because first,
defense counsel may blunder into offering proof rebutted by
illegally obtained evidence, and, second, one of two further
things may occur: either a court incongruously finds that the
otherwise admissible evidence obtained does not sufficiently
contribute to the truth, or the prosecutor fails to use it despite
having legal basis for doing so. 219 Therefore, courts turn James
on its head when they interpret it to encompass impeachment of
nontestifying defendants. It generates no additional deterrence
compared to what exclusion on the prosecution's case-in-chief
creates because the prosecution can anticipate illegally obtained
evidence's utility to deter or rebut any exculpatory evidence of
defendants' words or conduct. Meanwhile, it will occasionally
engender exclusion of illegally obtained evidence impeding truth
seeking for reasons that do not have any deterrent impact.
Ironically, abandoning the attempt further to fine-tune the
truth-seeking/deterrence balance in favor of a categorical
prohibition improves the status quo on both dimensions.
Categorical prohibition assures that there will be certain
deterrence beyond the prosecution's case-in-chief. By not
calling the defendant, defense counsel will know that she can
offer exculpatory evidence without fear of rebuttal. Meanwhile,
it assures that the inevitable truth-seeking cost of exclusion will
be justified by the additional deterrence that James sought. It
219 Nor does it make sense to think that investigators will be deterred by the
prospect of courts forgetting to give required limiting instructions and prosecutors
forgetting to follow local impeachment requisites such as the "explain or deny" rule.
See, e.g., McCracken v. State, 820 A.2d 593, 601-02 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003).
[Vol. 86, 1017
Truth, Deterrence, and the Impeachment Exception
therefore avoids the combination of random truth-seeking costs
and nonexistent deterrence that characterizes the status quo, a
quest simultaneously to further incompatible goals that leads to
the demise of both.
At the same time that categorical exclusion shows how
abandoning the quest for the Holy Grail of deterrence at no
truth-seeking cost can improve matters, it helps illustrate the
futility of figuring the scope of the impeachment exception by
balancing truth-seeking against deterrence without a firm
conception of how the two factors vary independently of each
other.2 20  Absent that explanation, the more probative the
illegally obtained evidence that is admitted, the more
significantly the truth is advanced and deterrence diminished.
Without meaningful isolation of factors besides exclusion's effect
on the truth to influence the likelihood of prosecutorial illegality,
the pursuit of those goals is a zero sum game because furthering
one necessarily requires undermining the other to an equivalent
extent. Consequently, any mix of truth seeking and deterrence
can be seen as a "balance" because any gains achieved on one
side of the scale are lost on the other.
The manipulation of truth seeking through evidentiary
distortion is an obviously unsuccessful attempt to avoid this trap.
Categorically prohibiting nontestifying defendants'
impeachment can prevent balancing from allowing what James
said about truth seeking entirely to eviscerate what James did
about deterrence and thereby preserve any benefits expected
from its choice of a trade-off point between never and always
allowing use of illegally obtained evidence to impeach. This is
no insignificant accomplishment. But beyond that, categorically
distinguishing between impeachment of testifying defendants
and other defense witnesses offers little assurance that the line it
draws is superior to the alternatives.
An assessment of all alternatives is far beyond the scope of
this Article. But it is possible briefly to consider the lessons of
James's interpretation for an alternative consistent with the
Court's views (1) that a complete ban on illegally obtained
impeachment evidence at trial imposes a fact-finding cost that
deterrence does not justify, and (2) that influences on
prosecutorial behavior besides those created by the scope of
220 For further discussion, see Kainen, supra note 33, at 1326-27.
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exclusion are too speculative to play a significant role in the
analysis. That alternative is to abandon the distinction between
impeachment of defendants and defense witnesses entirely in
favor of flipping a coin to determine whether illegally obtained
evidence can be used to impeach. It allows for selective use of
impeachment evidence and does not require the court to find
circumstances under which investigatory decisions are insensitive
to the prospect of obtaining impeachment proof. Flipping a coin
completes the process of separating admissibility prerequisites
from the evidence's contribution to truth seeking. In contrast,
continuing to distinguish impeachment of defendants and
defense witnesses for truth-seeking reasons (however
categorically and predictably), continues to fall into the trap of
assuring the prosecution that it can use its illegally obtained
evidence when it is most useful. Such assurance cannot but help
to undermine the deterrence benefits that the Court hopes will
continue to flow from selective exclusion.
In contrast, determining admissibility by the coin flip assures
deterrence that is more effective by detaching exclusion
decisions from the evidence's truth-seeking consequences. In
that respect, it promises to generate some deterrence benefit
from the inevitable truth-seeking costs of exclusion. Moreover,
the coin flip assures that there will be occasions when the
prosecution can make no use of its illegally obtained evidence.
Under the approach distinguishing impeachment of defendants
and defense witnesses, the prosecution always receives some
trial benefit from illegally obtained evidence despite its exclusion
from the case-in-chief. Even if the defendant does not testify,
the evidence is useful to deter his exculpatory testimony. Under
the coin flip, the prospect of any gain at all is only fifty percent,
even if the potential payoff (impeaching/deterring defendants
and their witnesses) is higher. Under the current approach
distinguishing impeachment of defendants and defense
witnesses, the prospect of gain is one hundred percent, even if
the potential payoff (impeaching/deterring only defendants) is
lower. Meanwhile, however, James defends the lower payoff by
arguing that the return on impeaching/deterring defendants is
much higher than for impeaching/deterring defense witnesses.
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Assuming, as this Article has, that the Court is correct to
associate a higher payoff with impeaching the defendant, 221 its
argument proves too much. The fact that there is always a
benefit to the prosecution coupled with the claim that the benefit
applies when the evidence is most important to the prosecution
proves the superiority of the coin flip. If the prosecution always
benefits to a degree proportional to the importance of its
illegally obtained impeachment evidence, we can expect that the
prospective advantage is more likely to make the marginal
difference when it considers obtaining the evidence than the coin
flip, which excludes the proof in half the cases despite its truth-
seeking consequence. The categorical exclusion of all
impeachment proof unless the defendant testifies, therefore,
while superior to current law allowing impeachment of
nontestifying defendants, still suffers from the Court's use of
truth seeking to justify results that only deterrence can defend.
Comparing the categorical rule with the coin flip shows that
the contribution of any exclusion under James to the additional
deterrence that the Court purportedly desires is minimal at best,
considering James's claim to reward the prosecution for
obtaining illegally the most important impeachment evidence.
Although the coin flip (unlike James) sometimes allows
impeachment of testifying defendants, it uses a fair coin as
opposed to one that, by allowing the most probative
impeachment evidence, amounts to a two-headed variety made
especially for the prosecution. It is no answer to justify that
result by citing truth-seeking benefits if one understands the
Court's claimed pursuit of additional deterrence as more than
disingenuous apology. A necessary first step is to rescue the
deterrence James promised from being lost in its truth-seeking
rationale. Nothing of consequence can be accomplished without
admitting the inevitable truth-seeking costs of exclusion.
However, recognizing those costs is only a prelude to imposing
them, even if selectively, in ways truly intended to induce
compliance.
221 In fact, there are many reasons to think that this is not true. See Kainen, supra
note 33, at 1313-15.
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CONCLUSION
For over half a century, the Court has attempted to sculpt an
impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule that creates an
optimal mix of truth seeking and deterrence. While a
metaphoric balance between these goals accurately depicts their
mutual exclusivity, the Court has also used that notion to suggest
that proper balancing of these factors reveals ways to enhance
one goal without diminishing the other. Rather than accomplish
that result, the Court's claim to advance deterrence without cost
has succeeded only in distorting the notion of impeachment
falsely to assert that truth-seeking considerations support
evidentiary limits on impeachment with illegally obtained
evidence that are inapplicable to lawful proof.
The most recent manifestation of this distortion is several
courts' misuse of evidence law to deny that applying the
impeachment exception to nontestifying defendants' hearsay
declarations routinely allows illegally obtained evidence and
thereby destroys whatever remaining deterrence otherwise flows
from prohibiting impeachment of defense witnesses. Some
courts avoid that conclusion by manipulating the Court's
ambiguous concept of truth seeking to exclude impeachment
evidence that, although important to finding the truth, they find
insufficiently probative of a witness's not speaking the truth.
Such manipulation has nothing to do with truth seeking as
understood by evidence law and amounts, at best, to a disguised
method of preserving deterrence. Meanwhile, most courts
simply use the concept of truth seeking consistently to extend
the exception, exploiting its ambiguity only to deny that by doing
so they have removed all deterrence. They leave it to some
future court under unspecified circumstances to take
responsibility for actually excluding some impeachment evidence
and being the bearer of the bad news that deterrence requires
imposition of truth-seeking costs.
One can hardly blame lower courts for the truth-seeking
discourse that amounts to little more than a charade. They
merely apply the Court's analysis when they pretend that truth
seeking justifies evidentiary limits on the use of illegal
impeachment proof at trial. Indeed, one cannot blame lower
courts for avoiding responsibility for delivering the bad news
that the Court itself shirks. Nevertheless, allocating blame is less
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important than recognizing how continuing the charade has
rendered counterproductive the efforts of even those courts who
would use it to preserve some modicum of deterrence. When
years of purportedly perfecting the balance between truth
seeking and deterrence manages to produce doctrine that
subverts both, it is necessary for all courts to focus reform where
the error in the analysis resides-in the conception underlying
the justificatory framework and not just in its specific
applications.
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